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A THEORY OF PROPERTY
Abraham Bellt & Gideon Parchomovskytt

Notwithstanding its importance, property law has eluded both a consistent definition and a unified conceptualframework. Indeed, modern property scholarship has utterly splintered the field. On the one hand,
instrumentalists view property as nothing more than default contract rules.
On the other hand, conceptualistsproclaim the primacy of in rem, rights and
specially privileged rights such as the rights to exclude, to use, and to transfer. Still other legal scholars think of property as a "bundle of sticks" capable
of assuming any shape orfform.
This Article proposes a unified theory of property predicated on the insight that property law is organized around creatingand defending the value
inherent in stable ownership. Focusingon the value of stable ownership renders coherent the splintered theories currently plaguingproperty scholarship
and provides useful conceptual, descriptive, and normative implications.
This Article begins by demonstrating that any coherent and comprehensive
property theory must addressfour legal questions: (1) What things are protected by property law; (2) vis-d-vis whom; (3) with what rights; and (4) by
what enforcement mechanism? Then, by focusing on the value inherent in
stable ownership, we comprehensively address these four questions, showing
how property law recognizes and helps create stable relationships between persons and assets, thereby allowing owners to extract utility otherwise
unavailable.
In addition to theoretical coherence, this approach provides conceptual
simplicity and clarity by rendering obsolete the "bundle of sticks" metaphor,
replacing it instead with the view that property rights are a means to property's end of defending the value of stable ownership. Furthermore, our
value-oriented approach has both descriptive and normative power. For instance, descriptively, this Article shows that the modern trend to reduce the
rights offinders of lost objects aims to protect the original owner's value of
stable ownership, as does the rejection of property claims by the good faith
purchaserof void title. Normatively, this Article demonstrates the need for
t
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reform in a number of areas, including nuisance law, where current doctrines protect an owner's right to "use and enjoyment," but fail to protect the

owner's right to value. Finally,the theory is extended to the outer boundaries
of property by examining situations where the decliningvalue of stable ownership suggests that property law should yield to the needs of otherfields like
contract law or secured transactions.
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A THEORY OF PROPERTY
INTRODUCTION

Property is important. Believed by some to be a keystone right,'
or even the core of liberty, 2 property lies at the foundation of both
contract and tort law. As a legal term, property is prominent in many
doctrines and statutes. Importantly, in contrast to contractual rights
that avail only against other parties to an agreement, property rights
avail against the rest of the world, irrespective of consent. Hence, classifying an interest as property has far-reaching implications in our legal system. A simple example demonstrates the power and
importance of property. Consider the conveyance of an automobile.
A contract can sufficiently allocate legal rights between Buyer and
Seller and, as between them, can render property law redundant. The
Buyer and Seller, however, have no contractual relationship with third
parties who may covet the automobile. Here, as between people out
of contractual reach from one another, property is dominant. Because it is practically impossible for contracts to arrange most of society's relationships, property law determines most of the legal
interactions regarding assets among people.
Yet, property law often seems to suffer from a characteristic disease of legal categories; everyone knows what it is, but no one can
define it. 3 Despite the recent renaissance of property as a subject of
academic inquiry,4 the field seems to be in insoluble theoretic disar-

I See generally Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right ?,71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 329
(1999) (reviewing and critically examining various sources that maintain property is a keystone right).
2

See MILTON FRiEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7-21 (1962) (arguing that private

property, in the form of economic freedom, is necessary for individual and political freedom); WALTER LIPPMANN, THE METHOD OF FREEDOM 101-02 (1934) ("[T]he only dependa-

ble foundation of personal liberty is the personal economic security of private property.");
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771-74 (1964) (positing that "civil
liberties must have a basis in property, or bills of rights will not preserve them").
3 Cf Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (StewartJ., concurring) (empathizing with "the Court, which . . .was faced with the task of trying to define what may be
indefinable" and, writing of "hard-core pornography" and the case at hand, "I shall not
today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within
that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But
I know it when I see it ....").

4 A number of recent articles have been distinguished by their excellence and the
importance of their contributions to the revival of property. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, The
Craft of Property, 91 CAL. L. REv. 1517 (2003) (claiming that the modern description of
property as a bundle of sticks and the conception of property as forms can be incorporated
into a realist approach to property); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property,
108 YALE. L.J. 1163 (1999) [hereinafter Heller, Boundaries] (examining the boundary principle of private property); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anti-Commons: Property in
Transitionfrom Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REv. 621 (1998) [hereinafter Heller, AntiCommons] (contributing a theory of anticommons property); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir,
The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of Property, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1669 (2003) (arguing for an objective theory of well-being for legal theory and developing an objective approach to property law); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in
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ray, with scholars scrambling to assemble a giant puzzle of ill-fitting
pieces. New theories tend toward the extremes of either denying any
meaning to property at all,5 or towards the magic of formalism, 6 and
both proclaim loudly-either proudly or shamefacedly-the complete
disconnect with popular conceptions of what property is and why it
7
should be protected.
Nowhere is the disjointedness of property theory more manifest
than in the gap between the two leading methodological approaches
to property analysis-instrumentalism, represented in the main by law
and economics,8 and formalism, or conceptualist scholarship. 9 The
two approaches seem so incompatible with one another that scholars

the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle,110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus] (analyzing the numerus clausus principle); Thomas W.
Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/ContractInterface, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 773 (2001)
[hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Property/ContractInterface] (exploring the distinction between
in personam contract rights and in rem property rights and presenting a functional explanation for the legal system's use of these two modalities of rights); Henry E. Smith, The
Language of Property:Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1105 (2003) (investigating the communicative aspect of property and considering the relationship between context and form, taking into account that the benefits and costs of communication vary with
the nature of the audience). See generally Symposium, The Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J.
LEG. STUD. S331 (2002) (assembling a series of articles regarding the evolution of property
rights and property theory).
5 See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY. NOMOS XXII
69, 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) ("By contrast, the theory of
property rights held by the modern specialist tends both to dissolve the notion of ownetship and to eliminate any necessary connection between property rights and thing."); Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REv. 1044, 1086 (1984)
(noting that "property is simply a label for whatever 'bundle of sticks' the individual has
been granted."); cf Adam Mossoff, What is Property?Puttingthe Pieces Back Together, 45 ARiz.
L, REV. 371, 374 (2003) (rejecting the exlusion theory of property and the bundle of
sticks, and stating: "[a]s with any bundle of items-say a shopping bag of fruit, filled with
oranges, apples, bananas and peaches-people are free to pack it and rearrange it in
whatever way they see fit.").

6 For an approach seeking to revive the importance of the traditional formal elements of property, see Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 4; Merrill & Smith,
Property/Contract Interface, supra note 4. Note that Merrill and Smith, as discussed in the
text, move far beyond formalism in advancing an informational theory of property.
7 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 113-15
(1977) (lamenting the absence of coherence in takings jurisprudence); JOHN G.
SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 1-2 (2000) (noting that while most people
think of property as "things," lawyers define property as "rights among people"); Grey,
supra note 5, at 69-70 (comparing the popular understanding of property as thing-ownership to the bundle of rights conception); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 357 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill &
Smith, What Happened to Property] (noting that "[a]lthough people are as concerned as ever
with acquiring and defending their material possessions, in the academic world there is
little interest in understanding property").
8 See infra Part I.C.
9 See infra Part I.D.
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belonging to each of the vying camps accuse their counterparts of mis0
understanding their topic of study.'
Law and economics scholars are pleased to eschew altogether any
special meaning for property, viewing it as an aggregation of legal
rights (or, in the common metaphor, a "bundle of sticks") no different than the legal rights aggregated under any other legal category. I
2
At the basis of many economic treatments lies a Coasian approach.'
This approach calls for well-defined legal rights to be first assigned
and then allocated through voluntary exchanges mediated by the law
of contracts.13 In Coase's view, property rights are simply background
rules-legally created entitlements awaiting reallocation through contract.1 4 And, although Coase acknowledged that the initial rights allo15
cation could affect the efficiency of an economic system,' most
subsequent economic theorists have declined to elaborate on this
point, choosing instead to devote their attention to the contractual
institutions allocating property rights. 16 Consequently, law and economics scholars attach no importance to property as a distinct field of
law; for purposes of the standard economic analysis, property might
just as well be the part of contract law that specifies default rules.
The conceptualists counter with notions derived from Roman
law, insisting on the primacy of in rem rights and specially privileged
17
rights, including the rights to exclude, use, and transfer property.
Some conceptualists advance instrumental reasons for certain ancient
rules, but they fail, or do not bother, to explain the institution of
property in its entirety.' 8 The instrumentalists, on the other hand,
have explained some enforcement rules and property characteristics,
but have little explanation-and, frankly, little use-for the aggregaMerrill & Smith, What Happened to Property, supra note 7, at 358 (accusing
10 See, e.g.,
law and economics scholars of not taking property seriously).
11 See id. (
To perhaps a greater extent than even the legal scholars, modern economists assume that property consists of an ad hoc collection of rights in resources. Indeed, there is a tendency among economists to use the term
property 'to describe virtually every device-public or private, common-law
or regulatory, contractual or governmental, formal or informal-by which
divergences between private and social costs or benefits are reduced.'
(citations omitted)).
12 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
13 Id. at 8-10.
14 Id. at 8.
15 Id. at 16 (noting that in a world with positive transaction costs "the initial delimitation of legal rights does have an effect on the efficiency with which the economic system
operates").
16 For detailed discussion, see infta Part I.C.
17
See, e.g., A.M. Honor6, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUODENCE 107 (A.G.
Guest ed., 1961) (providing a list and explanation of leading property incidents). For a
detailed discussion of his work, see infra Part I.B.
18 See infra Part 1.B.
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tion of ancient forms defining the law of property.1 9 Off to the side,
scholars occasionally note that neither theoretical approach connects
very well with the popular conceptions of what property is and why it
is valuable, 20 but the critics have not been able to create a theory to
compete with either the instrumentalists or the conceptualists.
Remarkably, what some might consider the central feature of
property-its function as a device for capturing and retaining certain
kinds of value-is almost completely absent from modern conceptual
discussions of property. 2 1 It was not always so. In earlier centuries,
the issue of value almost completely dominated theories of property:
how property created value, to whom it properly belonged, and how it
helped capture and retain value for its rightful (or wrongful) owner.
John Locke, for example, in his Second Treatise of Government, suggested
that labor was the source of added value and that adding labor to
natural resources, including the labor of finding the resource, created
property naturally belonging to the laborer.2 2 Karl Marx agreed with
and extended the labor theory of value, arguing that recognizing capitalists' property rights permitted alienation of value from its "true"
23
owners-the workers.
As these earlier conceptions of value have faded away, so have
their importance to property theory. In modern economics, value is
created not by any intrinsic worth of inputs (such as labor); rather,
value is created by relative tastes and scarcity of resources, while profit
is created by arbitrage, relying on differences in taste, information, or
nearly any other factor. 24 Thus, today it is believed that the institution
of property is not necessary to guarantee the "real value" of an item

See infra Part I.C.
See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 957
(1982) (proposing a personhood theory of property, wherein some control over resources
in a person's external environment is necessary to proper self-development and noting
how such a theory is often implicit in court opinions and commentaries, yet ignored in
legal thought); see also Meir Dan-Cohen, The Value of Ownership, GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS,
2001, at 1, available at http://www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/voll/iss2/art4 (last visited
Feb. 4, 2005).
21
See infra Part I.
27, at 17 (Thomas P. Rear22 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT
don ed., Liberal Arts Press 1952) (1690) (reasoning that
every man has a property in his own person;... The labor of his body and
the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he
removes out of the state that Nature has provided and left it in, he has
mixed his labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, and
thereby makes it his property.
19

20

KARL MARX, CAPITAL 1-99 (David McLellan ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1995) (1867).
See ADAM SMITH, 1 THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 19-25 (1964) (examining value as a
function of utility, scarcity, taste, and transferability).
23
24

20051

A THEORY OF PROPERTY

for its "true" owner.2 5 This logic, however, is flawed. The modern
view that value derives from subjective tastes, rather than a platonic
form of the "true" price, does not alter the fact that property is an
institution uniquely qualified to protect certain kinds of value. Thus,
even in a world where value is contingent rather than absolute, value
remains the conceptual lynchpin of property theory.
To eliminate possible confusion, it is important to clarify at the
outset that, as used in this Article, value is synonymous with utility or
welfare as used in the field of welfare economics.2 6 Hence, this Article's account belongs in the instrumentalist tradition. The Article departs from previous law and economics scholarship in that it seeks to
evaluate the utility of property as a discrete legal field and unearth its
defining characteristics. Instead of viewing property doctrines as contract's gap-filling rules, this Article views property as a legal field that
stands on its own and serves its own goals. In other words, the Article
argues that property as a field creates utility not provided by other
fields like contract, just as previous scholars have argued that criminal
2 7
law as a field creates utility not provided by other fields like tort.
The framework developed here explains why formal features of property beloved by property conceptualists are indispensable to a proper
instrumentalist understanding of property. 28 Simultaneously, to the
conceptualists, this Article shows that even in the muddled world of
modern property theory, value is the central concept uniting the law
of property. 29 Stated otherwise, this Article's mission is to explain the
"individuation" of property, to borrow a phrase from Joseph Raz by
25 See id. at 29 ("The labourer is rich or poor, is well or ill rewarded, in proportion to
the real, not to the nominal price of his labour."). As Adam Smith further observed,
"[w]hat everything is really worth to the man who has acquired it, and who wants to dispose of it or exchange it for something else, is the toil and trouble which it can save to
himself, and which it can impose upon other people." Id. at 26. Thus, according to Smith,
"real value" is the "the value of a certain quantity of labour which we exchange for what is
supposed at the time to contain the value of an equal quantity." Id. "Nominal value," on
the other hand, is the quantity of money paid for a good. Id. at 29.
26 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARv. L. REv. 961,
968 (2001) (defining welfare economics as "the method of policy assessment that depends
solely on individuals' well-being" and noting that the welfare economics "conception of
individuals' well-being is a comprehensive one. It recognizes not only individuals' levels of
material comfort, but also their degree of aesthetic fulfillment, their feelings for others,
and anything else that they might value, however intangible.").
27
See, e.g.,John C. Coffee,Jr., Does "Unlawful"Mean "Criminal"?:Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/CrimeDistinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REv. 193, 193-94 (1991) ("[T] he
factor that most distinguishes the criminal law is its operation as a system of moral education and socialization. . . . Far more than tort law, [which focuses on compensating victims,] the criminal law is a system for public communication of values."); cf TOM R. TYLER,
WHv PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 42-44 (1990) (providing survey results suggesting that people
obey the criminal law because of its moral legitimacy, rather than its deterrent threat).
28 See infra Part III.
29 See infra Part III.C.
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way of J.E. Penner. 30 That is, this Article explains why there is a
branch of law called property and what purposes property law serves.
The account in this Article is predicated on the insight that property law as a legal institution is organized around creating and defending the value inherent in stable ownership. Property law both
recognizes and helps create stable relationships between persons and
assets, 31 allowing owners to extract utility that is otherwise unavailable.
Adopting this focus enables us to recast many of the key insights of the
extant property literature and demonstrate that these insights can
form a coherent theory of property.
As a first step, this Article analyzes the seemingly chaotic body of
property literature and distills the foundational questions a comprehensive property theory must address. The Article posits that contemporary scholarship clusters around four questions: (1) which legal
entitlements qualify for legal recognition as property rights?; (2)
against whom do the rights apply?; (3) what is the content of property
rights-i.e., what kinds of rights does the legal category of property
bestow upon the owner?; and (4) what should be the remedies for
property right infringement?
Curiously, property scholars have shied away from offering theories addressing these four questions as a whole, electing instead to
engage in discrete analyses that center on one or several of these
themes.32 At the risk of a mild overgeneralization, law and economics
scholars have limited their investigations to the question of protection, while conceptualist theorists have focused their endeavors on the
three other questions.33 Yet, even the conceptualists have not sought
to structure property theory around a single principle. 4 Radin, for
35
example, has devoted her attention primarily to the first question,
30

J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY N LAW 32-67 (1997).

31 For detailed discussion, see infta Part lJ.B.
32 One notable exception is Laura Underkuffler, who ventured to develop a unified
perspective to explain the concept of property. Underkuffler's perspective, however, differs significantly from this Article's perspective. In a very important book, Underkuffler
analyzes the concept of property along four dimensions. The first dimension is "a theory
of rights;" the second is "space, or area of field;" the third is "stringency" (of protection);
and the fourth is "time." See LAuRA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTYm ITS MEANING
AND POWER 16-33 (2003).
"3 See infra Parts I.B., I.C.
34 See infra Part I.B.
35 See Marga-etjane Radin, Essay, Compensation and Commensurability,43 DuKE L.J. 56,
72 (1993) (noting the challenge in determining tort compensation for pain and suffering,
solace, and other nonmarket damages elements); MargaretJane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudenceof Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1667
(1988) (exploring the liberal conception of property and its presence in our constitution);
Radin, supranote 20, at 986 (proposing a Hegelian notion of personal property as imbuing
the owner with greater property rights than fungible property); Margaret Jane Radin, Address, What, ifAnything, Is Wrong with Baby Selling?, 26 PAC. L.J. 135, 135 (1995) (exploring
the legal ramifications of surrogacy, beginning with the issue of babies as property).
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36
while Merrill and Smith have directed their interest to the second,
37
Worse yet, the disand Honor6 has elected to explore the third.
crete analyses of each question have been conducted from varying
and inconsistent perspectives.
This Article, by contrast, focuses not on a discrete question but
on a common concept. This Article postulates that the value inherent
in stable ownership plays an unheralded but key role in answering all
four questions, rendering a confused field coherent. Furthermore,
the Article demonstrates that the classic incidents of property are
subordinate to the overriding goal of defending value and, therefore,
must sometimes give way to a rule that protects value. Consequently,
the theoretical framework proposed here extends to many of the satellite concepts that have been present in recent property scholarship,
and alienate in order
such as legal restrictions on the rights to exclude
38
to prevent the overfragmentation of property.

Theoretical coherence is by no means the only virtue of this Article's analysis. An important result of the Article's theory is the abolition of the universally accepted but rarely understood
characterization of property as a bundle of rights. In this Article,
property is viewed as a mechanism for defending stable ownership
value; thus, the various rights attending property are best viewed not
as random sticks, but rather as means to property's end. This Article
demonstrates that a focus on stable ownership value is necessary to
solve Coase's open puzzle of arranging legal entitlements in order to
maximize economic efficiency.39 The realm of contracts is much
smaller than assumed by standard analyses, and a law of property
based on stable ownership value is thus essential to assuring the maximization of social welfare.
In addition to its conceptual implications, the value-oriented theory of property developed in this Article has both descriptive and normative power. Descriptively, this Article posits that the modern trend
toward reducing the rights of non-owner possessors in fields such as
the law of find 4° aims to protect the value of the original owner's sta36
See generally Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 4 (contending that
courts should maintain limits upon the exercise of property rights for the sake of efficiency); Merrill & Smith, Property/ContractInterface, supra note 4 (attempting to delineate

property law and contract law by contrasting the in rem and in personam rights protected
by each respective branch); Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property, supra note 7 (lamenting the decline of property as "a distinctive in rem right" and advocating the utility of
such an approach).
37
See, e.g., Honore, supra note 17.
38 Following Michael Heller's influential article, the problem of overfragmentation is
often referred to in the literature as "anti-commons." See Heller, Anti-Commons, supra note
4, at 624.
39 See infra Part I.C.
40
See infra Part V.A.
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ble ownership. The value theory similarly sheds new light on the primacy of the right to exclude in property law. Exclusion preserves
owners' idiosyncratic values and bargaining position. Hence, it is fitting to allow (as current law does) harsh punishment for ostensibly
trivial trespass. 41 This Article explains the logic behind various partition rules and even some of the complexities of property rules con42
cerning possession and chain of title.
Normatively, the value-oriented theory of property demonstrates
the need for reform in a number of different areas. For instance, the
value theory suggests that current nuisance law offers incomplete protection to property owners. 4 3 Current law protects only the owners'
right to the "use and enjoyment" of their property, unfettered by unreasonable interference from their neighbors. A reformulated law of
nuisance, by contrast, would also protect the owners' right to value.
Another area of law ripe for rethinking under a value theory of property is the controversial subject of takings. The value theory provides
an explanation for the Fifth Amendment's exclusive focus on property
in takings protection; however, it challenges the current understanding of just compensation as being payment of market value since this
measure misses the very element justifying extra property
44
protection.
Finally, this Article extends its theory to the outer boundaries of
property by examining situations in which other welfare considerations may limit the usefulness of property. 45 In such boundary situations, this Article argues that protection of stable ownership may bow
partially, or completely, to the needs of other fields like contract or
secured transactions. Here, again, the key is the importance of stable
ownership value; as this value declines in magnitude, property law is
removed from the picture, and legal disputes can and should be resolved by means of other legal tools. Among the fields analyzed in this
framework are secured transactions and marital property.
The Article develops the stable ownership value theory of property as follows. Part I reviews the extant theoretical property literature. Part II identifies the core function of property as creating and
defending the value inherent in stable property ownership. This leads
to a reevaluation of property scholarship in Part III and an examination of where current scholarship succeeds and fails in explaining the
design of the legal field of property. Part IV delineates the contours
41
See, e.g.,Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 563 N.W.2d 154, 165-66 (Wis. 1997) (upholding an award of $100,000 in punitive damages against the defendant for delivering a mobile home over the plaintiffs property, notwithstanding the absence of "real" damages).
42
See infra Part V.A-B.
43
See infra Part VIA.
44
See infa Part VI.B.
45
See infra Part VII.
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of property by crafting a four-step analysis. Using this new analysis,
the Part demonstrates that the value theory provides a comprehensive
framework for understanding property. Part V explores ways in which
the Article's new concept of property illuminates current areas of law.
Finally, Part VI highlights principles and doctrines in need of revision
in light of the Article's new framework, while Part VII examines the
boundary questions of property.
I
THE THEORY OF PROPERTY

This Article begins its foray into the thicket of property theory by
describing some of the prominent past approaches to property. This
Part aims to produce a rough grouping of various theories of property
in order to advance the analysis of these theories' strengths and weaknesses, as well as enable a reordering of the theoretical approach in
the next two Parts.
A.

A Natural Right to Property

Aristotle conceived of the right to property as inherent in the
47
moral order.46 Criticizing Plato's preference for common property,
Aristotle argued for the primacy of private property because it would
encourage people to attend to their own affairs rather than unduly
interfering in the affairs of others. 48 Aristotle held this incentive to be
the result of a self-love implanted by nature, such that only respect for
private property could encourage the important virtue of liberality in
the matter of property. 49 Interestingly, Aristotle viewed the right to
exclude as a key component of property rights because it allowed owners to display virtue by waiving this right and sharing the benefits of
property ownership with others.50
In this tradition, early post-Enlightenment theories of property
focused on a "natural" right to property. Perhaps the most famous of
51
these theories is "the labor theory" associated with John Locke.
Locke's point of departure was that God gave mankind in common
the bountiful nature of the earth. 52 Locke then posited that "every
man has a property in his own person" and in "[t] he labor of his body
46
47
48
4_9
50

ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 1 5, at 25-29 (Stephen Everson ed., 1988).
PLATO, REPUBLIC 5 § 2, at 7-9 (S. Halliwell trans., 1993).
ARISTOTLE, supra note 46,
5, at 26.
Id.
5, at 26-27.
Id. 5, at 26 ("And yet by reason of goodness, and in respect of us 'Friends', as the

proverb says, 'will have all things common'. . . . For, although every man has his own
property, some things he will place at the disposal of his friends, while of others he shares
the use with them.").

51
52

LOCKE, supra note 22.
Id. 1 26, at 17.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:531

and the work of his hands."5 3 Locke, therefore, deemed it just that
one who expended labor upon objects could remove them from the
common and claim them as private property. 54 Locke also added a
utilitarian dimension by claiming that objects could not be beneficial
55
to mankind until reduced to private property.
A different natural rights justification for property was developed
by Freidrich Hegel. 56 Hegel's "personhood theory" relies on the premise that property provides the mechanism by which humans achieve
self-actualization. 57 Hegel posited that people's core is found in their
will.58 The will, however, needs material objects to express itself, and
private property is therefore indispensable to the external manifestation of the will. 59 Likewise, society's recognition of private property
further contributes to self-realization by respecting human agency.
Thus, Hegel wrote that there can be no individual freedom without
private property providing freedom's external sphere. 60
In time, natural rights theories of property fell into eclipse, especially in the wake of the Realist movement. 61 With only a few notable
exceptions, such as Richard Epstein's qualified endorsement of a
Lockean concept of property62 and MargaretJane Radin's embrace of
a version of Hegel's ideas about the importance of property to personhood, 63 most scholars today base their understandings of property
on a model where property isjustified by utilitarianism and defined by
positive law rather than upon natural rights theories.

53

Id.

54
55

See id.
Id.
26, at 17.

27, at 17.

56 Some have noted that while Hegel argued for the importance of property on moral
grounds, Hegel does not advance a natural rights-based, or even a rights-based, theory. See
Si-itOMO AVINERI, HEFcI.'s THEORY OF THE MODERN STATE 132 (1972) (noting that Hegel's
concept of human freedom "is not to be found in any legendary state of nature, but evolves
precisely out of his effort to dissociate himself from his state of primeval savagery") ;Jeanne
Lorraine Schroeder, Virgin Territory: MargaretRadin's Imagery ofPersonalProperty as the Inviolate Feminine Body, 79 MINN. L. REV. 55, 124 n.263 ("Hegel's property theory is intensely
anti-naturalistic.").
57
G.W.F. HEGEL, PHIOSOP-w or RIGHT 45, at 52 (S.W. Dyde trans., 1996) (1896).
58
Id.
39-45, at 46-52.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
See, e.g., Mossoff, supra note 5, at 372 (2003) ("Since the turn of the century, the
concept of property had succumbed to the acid wash of a nominalism first popularized in

the law by the legal realists.").
62
See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,

TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-

NENT DOMAIN 11-12 (1985) ("[If we correct [Locke's] account of the original position to
remove all traces of original ownership in common, then the soundness of his position is
true, afortiori."). But see notes 323-25 and accompanying text.
63
See Radin, supra note 20.
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B.

Positivism and Conceptualism

Jeremy Bentham, who scathingly dismissed natural rights,
launched perhaps the most famous attack on natural rights theories:
Right... is the child of law; from real laws come real rights; from
imaginary laws, from laws of nature, fancied and invented by poets,
rhetoricians, and dealers in moral and intellectual poisons, come
imaginary rights, a bastard brood of monsters.... Natural rights is
simple nonsense: natural and6 4imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense-nonsense upon stilts.
Naturally, Bentham was equally as dismissive of property rights as natural rights. In his view, "[p]roperty and law are born together, and
die together. Before laws were made there was no property; take away
laws, and property ceases." 65 Bentham suggested, instead, a utilitarian
basis for the law, 66 an idea that eventually bore fruit in such frankly
utilitarian legal analyses as the burgeoning economic analysis of law.
During the nineteenth century, however, while natural rights theories continued to reign supreme, William Blackstone provided the
dominant understanding of property rights. Blackstone, nominally a
believer in natural rights, but a formalist and conceptualist in practice, was less interested in the justifications for property law, and more
in the minutae of its substance. 67 In his Commentaries on the Laws of
England, Blackstone coined a formulation that eventually became the
rallying cry of an expansive understanding of property. Property,
wrote Blackstone, is "that sole and despotic dominion which one man
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe." 6 8 This
famous formulation includes several central elements. First, property
is concerned with rights in rem, i.e., "those rights which a man may
acquire in and to such external things as are unconnected with his
person."69 Second, in the ideal, property belongs to a single individual, or as Blackstone put it, "one man." 70 Third, where land is concerned, property rights extend indefinitely upwards into the heavens
and downwards to the center of the earth. 7 1 Fourth, the principal
right attached to property is the right to exclude "any other individual
64 2JEREMY BENTHAM, AnarchicalFallacies,in THE WORKS OFJEREMY BENTHAM 489, 523,
501 (J. Bowring ed., 1983).
65
JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 113 (C.K Ogden ed., 1931) (1882).
66

Id.

67

See Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L.

68

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,

(Wayne Morrison ed., 2001)
69
70
71

Id.
Id.
Id. at Chap. 2, 13-15.

REV.

1, 4 (1996).
Chap. 1, 3

11 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND,

(1765-1769).
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in the universe." 72 While Blackstone probably did not intend this result, 73 modern theorists associated this formulation with an absolutist
view of property that eventually came to be known, somewhat inaccurately, as the "Blackstonian bundle of land entitlements." 74 The
Blackstonian bundle presupposes impeccably demarcated parcels
whose boundaries extend upward to the heavens and downward to the
depths of the earth, and bestows upon owners unbridled powers and
75
privileges to use, transfer, and even abuse land.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the Blackstonian conception began to wear. In a highly influential series of
articles, Wesley Hohfeld sought to render legal thought more coherent by clarifying the basic concepts of the law. 76 Concerned about the
looseness with which legal terminology had been used, Hohfeld refined existing concepts and created new ones to develop a comprehensive legal taxonomy. 77 Of particular importance here is his
treatment of property rights. While Hohfeld listed ownership as his
paradigmatic example of an in rem right, he reconceived of in rem
rights as mere expressions of in personam rights vis-A-vis an indefinitely large class of people. 78 Hohfeld also pointed out that property,
as a legal concept, comprises not only rights, 79 but also privileges 8
and powers.8 1 He further elucidated that the crux of property is not a
relationship between a person and an object, as Blackstone had suggested, but rather a nexus of legal relationships among people regardId. at Chap. 1, 3.
See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 67, at 30-31 & n.176 (criticizing modern property
theorists for misstating Blackstone's view of property rights).
74
See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1362-63 (1993)
(listing the Blackstonian package of private entitlements).
72
73

75

Id.

Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning,26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917) [hereinafter Hohfeld 1I]; Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some
FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning,23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) [hereinafter Hohfeld I].
76

77

78

Id.

Hohfeld II, supra note 76, at 718-33.
Hohfeld gives meaning to "right" by comparison to its correlative "duty" through
an example: "if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former's land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off the place." Hohfeld I,
supra note 76, at 32. Compare definitions of "privilege," infra note 80, with definition of
"power," infra note 81.
80
For Hohfeld, the antithesis of the right-duty relationship is the privilege-no-right
relationship. Hohfeld 1, supra note 76, at 32. Thus, "privilege" gets meaning by comparison to the correlative, "no-right" by his example: "whereas X has a right or claim that Y, the
other man, should stay off the land, he himself has the privilegeof entering on the land; or,
in equivalent words, X does not have a duty to stay off." Id.
81 "Power," in the Hohfeldian taxonomy, has the correlative "liability." Id. at 44.
Thus, a "power-holder" is one who has the capacity to alter the legal status of the "liabilitybearer." See id; see also RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF PROPERTY § 3 illus. 1-3 (1936).
79
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ing an object.8 2 Hohfeld did not intend to create a comprehensive
view. While his analysis of whether property should properly be
viewed as an in rem right has since become a staple of property theory, Hohfeld saw no need to address the practical implications of his
taxonomy. 8 3 Working from a purely conceptual perspective, Hohfeld
8 4
did not concern himself with policy issues at all.
Nevertheless, Holifeld's observations generally are credited with
having created an entirely new understanding of property as a "bundle of rights."8 5 The "bundle of rights" concept of property denies
any fixed meaning to the term property and deemphasizes the importance of the thing with regard to which the rights are claimed. 6 In
the bundle metaphor, each right, power, privilege, or duty is but one
8 7
stick in an aggregate bundle that constitutes a property relationship.
Whether removing a stick (or set thereof) from the bundle will negate
the classification of the remainder as property cannot be determined
in advance."8 Thus, the bundle of rights theory transformed property
82

This conclusion arises from the observation that rights are by definition relation-

ship between people. See supra note 79. Where there is a right there must necessarily be a
correlative duty, and an object cannot owe a duty. Id.
83
See Hohfeld 11, supra note 76; Hohfeld I, supranote 76.
84

See id.

85

See, e.g., Katy Barnett, Case Note, Western Australia v. Ward: One Step Forwardand

Two Steps Back: Native Title and the Bundle of Rights Analysis, 24 MELB. U. L. REv. 462, 469
(2000) ("The bundle of rights theory is the dominant paradigm applied by Western legal
philosophers, combining the theories of Hohfeld and Honor."); Merrill & Smith, Property/
ContractInter.ace, supra note 4, at 783 ("Although Hohfeld did not adopt the metaphor of a
'bundle of rights,' [his work] . . . directly anticipates [the] adoption . . . [favored] by the
Legal Realists."); J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 U.C.L.A. L. Rh-v.
711, 724-25 (1996) (stating that Hohfeld "provide[d] the frame in which the bundle of
rights picture is constructed"); Courtney C. Tedrowe, Note, Conceptual Severance and Takings in the Federal Circuit, 85 CORNELL L. Rv. 586, 589 (2000) ("Wesley Hohfeld first attempted to construct a theory of property out of the bundle-of-rights metaphor."). But see
Myr L. Duncan, Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a Community-Based Resource, 32
ENV-L. L. 773, 774 n.1 (2002) (citing William M. Wiecek for the proposition that "the
phrase 'bundle of rights' first appeared inJOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT
DOMAIN IN THE UNITED SrATES 41, 43 (1888)");Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-o-Stix:
A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregationof Property, 93 MICH. L. REv. 239, 239-40 n.2 (1994)
(deriding the "familiar 'bundle of fights' notion," as "a vulgarization of Hohfeld's analytic
scheme .... ").
86
See supra note 11.
87

Id.

88

Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 510 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J.,

dissenting) (
[Though a] ...
limitation or prohibition diminishes the bundle of rights
that would otherwise attach to the property, [ ] what remains is still deemed
in law to be a protectible property interest. . . . [This is because], '...
property or title is a complex bundle of rights, duties, powers and immunities, [and] the pruning away of some or a great many of these elements
does not entirely destroy the title ....
(quoting People v. Walker, 90 P.2d 854 (1939))).
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into an almost infinitely malleable concept, amenable to numerous
permutations, and subject to ad hoc decisionmaking.
A.M. Honore played a decisive role in advancing the bundle of
rights metaphor by cataloguing a generally accepted list of the "incidents" of property or ownership.8 9 Acknowledging that the "fashion
[of] speak[ing] of ownership as if were just a bundle of rights" might
require small modification of the list, Honor nevertheless confidently asserted:
Ownership comprises the right to possess, the right to use, the right
to manage, the right to the income of the thing, the right to the
capital, the right to security, the rights or incidents of transmissibility and absence of term, the prohibition of harmful use, liability to
execution, and the incident of residuarity: this makes eleven leading
incidents.9"
Importantly, Honor6 noted that the importance of the list lay in it
being an alternative to the "distortion" of the past, in which it was
viewed as property in the concentration of absolute rights of use, exclusion and transfer 9 in a single individual.92 Honor4 emphasized
instead the lack of primacy of any individual stick in the bundle. 93
Today, the bundle of rights conception of property rules the academic field. As Bruce Ackerman noted acerbically, the concept has
become a "consensus view so pervasive that even the dimmest law student can be counted upon to parrot the ritual phrases on command. '9 4 The result has been what some lament as the end of
property law. In Thomas Grey's words,
We have gone . . . in less than two centuries, from a world in
which property was a central idea mirroring a clearly understood
institution to one in which it is no longer a coherent or crucial category in our conceptual scheme. The concept of property and the
institution of property have disintegrated ...
The substitution of a bundle-of-rights for a thing-ownership
conception of property has the ultimate consequence that property
95
ceases to be an important category in legal and political theory.
C.

Utilitarianism

As the legal conceptualization of property changed, so too did
the justifications for property. The seeds planted by Bentham 96 struck
89

90

91
92

93
94

9-5
96

See Honore, supra note 17, at 112-28.
!d. at 113.

Honor& added "immunity from expropriation" to the list. Id.
Id,
Id.
AcKERMAN, supra note 7, at 26.

Grey, supra note 5, at 74, 81.
See supraPart I.B.
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root, and today, many influential scholars justify property on instrumental and positive grounds. Today, there is widespread agreement
that the law orders property in response to societal needs, rather than
in obeisance to a moral command or the natural order of the
universe .7
Property, like many other legal fields, has been heavily influenced
by the movement to apply economic analysis to legal questions.
Credit for generating this field has been ascribed at different times to
Oliver Wendell Holmes, 98 Ronald Coase, 9 and Richard Posner; t0 0 today, however, it is Coase's ideas that have had the most lasting impact
in the field. Like much of modern law and economics, the two organizing principles of property law analysis are externalities and transaction costs. Negative externalities are costs created by one actor
borne by another) 1' Classical economics views externalities as a market failure that prevents otherwise competitive markets from achieving
allocative efficiency.' 0 2 Ronald Coase revolutionized the field by noting that externalities will only lead to inefficiency where transaction
costs impair private bargaining.1 0 3 In the absence of transaction costs,
he wrote, parties would always negotiate for an efficient result notwithstanding externalities.10 4 While Coase paid no heed to the content of
property, his analysis set the groundwork for subsequent
contributions.
97 To be sure, there remain some natural theory defenses of property, especially those
sounding in Locke's theory. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A Irperty Right in Self-Expression:
Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993)
(proposing a natural rights-based theory of intellectual property). Indeed, Locke's theory
of natural rights in property continues to influence courts, especially in the area of intellectual property. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002-03 (1984) (citing
Locke's Second Treatise as support for their holding that trade secret rights can be considered "property" under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
98
See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS iN THE
LEGAL PROFESSION Is TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 187 (1994) ("[Holmes'] writings,
studded with quotable aphorisms, set the intellectual agenda of the law for the entire twentieth century. Legal realism, pragmatism, sociological jurisprudence, law and economics,
and critical legal studies are all elaborations of themes announced by Holmes."); see also
RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw 13--15 (1995).
99 See, e.g., George L. Priest, Gossiping About Ideas, 93 YALE L.J. 1625, 1629 (1984)
(book review) ("The conceptual revolution that provided the vision ... was the Chicago
School law and economics of Ronald Coase.").
100 See, e.g, Gary Minda, TheJurisprudentialMovements of the 1980s, 50 OHIo ST. L.J. 599,
605 (1989) (writing that "these 'hardliners' of the Chicago School (the founding fathers) ... advocated strong claims based on the law-and-efficiency hypothesis. This hypothesis [is] normally associated with the views of Judge Richard A. Posner .... ").
lot
102

See R.H. COASE, THE FIRMts,THE MARKET, AND THE LAw 23-24 (1988).
PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 756 (15th ed. 1995) (de-

fining market failure as "[a]n imperfection in a price system that prevents an efficient
allocation of resources.
Important examples are externalities and imperfect
competition").
103
R.H. COASE, supra note 101, at 12-13.
104 Id. at 13-15.
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Harold Demsetz built on Coase's foundation in advancing his important evolutionary theory of private property. 10 5 Demsetz's point of
departure was identical to Locke's-a hypothesized early state of nature in which property was held in common. 10 6 Demsetz's explanation of the transition from commons property to private property,
however, was very different. Demsetz noted that in comparison with
commons, private ownership permitted a single owner to internalize
most costs and benefits, and greatly reduced the number of people
exposed to externalities. 10 7 Thus, Demsetz expected private property
to arise whenever the gains produced by internalization exceeded the
transaction costs involved in establishing the property right and the
legal system designed to protect that right.'0 8 Interestingly, Demsetz's
justification for property was not accompanied by any extended analysis of the, concept or content of property. Thus, Demsetz unwittingly
contributed to the further disintegration of the notion of property by
signaling the divorce of normative and descriptive property theory. 10 9
A new level of ambiguity was added to scholarly understandings
of property in the law and economic literature by Guido Calabresi and
Douglas Melamed. Calabresi and Melamed elected to attach "property" to a type of legal enforcement which they termed "entitlements."110 By doing so, Calabresi and Melamed effectively added a
third layer to the already-bifurcated property analysis. Working from
the Coasean perspective, Calabresi and Melamed devised a tripartite
menu of protecting legal entitlements, consisting of inalienability rule
protection, property rule protection, and liability rule protection." 1
Entitlements protected by an inalienability rule may not be transferred even with the consent of the owner.11 2 Those entitlements protected by a property rule may be transferred by the owner at a price to
which the owner agrees. 113 As for entitlements protected by a liability
rule, they may be taken by third parties in exchange for the payment
of a price determined by the third party; the owner has no veto power,
14
and must suffice herself with the compensation she receives.
The taxonomy devised by Calabresi and Melamed, although ingenious, confused the concept of property. For while the term "prop105
106

Id. at 354.
d.

107

Harold Demsetz, To-ward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM.

ECON. Rav.

347, 355-56

(1967).
108
109
110
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Id. at 350.
Id. at 354-59.
Id.

Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HAJv. L. Ray. 1089, 1092 (1972).
112
Id. at 1092-93.
113 Id. at 1092.
114
Id.
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erty rule protection" implies a tight relation to property, this allusion
is misleading. Alongside the normative justifications for property and
the descriptive analyses of property's incidents, Calabresi and Melamed described property as a mode of protection that enabled entitlement holders to enjoin nonconsensual uses of their entitlement-a
power they dubbed "property rule protection." 115 Moreover, Calabresi and Melamed aggravated the confusion at the descriptive level
by suggesting that any legal entitlement could be subject to property
rule protection, thereby conflating the entire Hohfeldian vernacular"16 into a single, catch-all term that fails to discriminate between
property rights and other legal rights.
Yoram Barzel introduced yet another division of property. Barzel
distinguished between "economic property," defined as "the individual's ability, in expected terms, to consume the good (or the services of the asset)
directly or to consume it indirectly through exchange," and "legal
property," defined as those economic property rights that are "recognized and enforced, in part, by the government."1 17 Economic property, for
Barzel, is an exceptionally broad term, encompassing the rights of anyone with any ability to consume the good in any fashion." 8 For instance, in Barzel's view, a car thief is a co-owner of a car along with the
tite holder, because each has the ability to consume, in certain circumstances, a portion of the attributes of the asset.' 1 9
Barzel also relied upon Coase's insights to argue that the crux of
property is the allocation of rights in environments of positive transaction costs. 1 20 Barzel's model stipulated that private contracting would
invariably fail to capture certain valuable attributes of assets. 12' The
legal institution of property, on Barzel's view, simply organized some
forms of protection for those attributes of an asset not addressed by
optimal contracting. 122 For Barzel, therefore, property is a residual
institution subordinate to the institution of contracts; legal property is
an even less significant factor, because it is concerned with some in23
stances in which the state might protect economic property rights.'
As Barzel put it, "[a]t the heart of the study of property lies the study
of contracts."' 2 4 Yet, as Smith and Merrill astutely observed, Barzel's
analysis suffers from a potential baseline problem. Barzel's analysis is
115
116

Id.
See supra Part I.B.
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YoRAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 3-4 (2d ed. 1997).
See id.
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See id.
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See id. at 7-9, 11-13.
Id. at 39-40.
Id. at 141.
Id,
Id. at 33.
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predicated on the primacy of contracts over property, but as Merrill
and Smith point out "one cannot enter into contracts over the use of
resources without some baseline to determine who contracts with
125
whom."
In the final tally, the positivist and utilitarian analyses have splintered the institution of property in several ways. Positivists have driven
a wedge between descriptive and normative dimensions of property.
Utilitarians have contributed to the incoherence by breaking the concept of property into legal rights and economic rights (Barzel), and
divorcing the issue of primary rights from the issue of enforcement
(Calabresi and Melamed).
D.

Relational Conceptions of Property

In juxtaposition to the utilitarian and conceptualist property theories, a different analysis recently arose emphasizing the interpersonal
relationships surrounding property rights. The most notable work in
this genre is Margaret Jane Radin's Property and Personhood.1 26 Building on Hegel's theory, Radin introduced an important distinction between personal and fungible property.' 27 An object belongs in the
former category "if its loss causes pain that cannot be relieved by the
object's replacement." 128 In contrast, it comes within the latter if
"perfectly replaceable with other goods of equal market value."' 129
Personal property constitutes one's self; fungible property is held for
"purely instrumental reasons."1 30 Radin, then, suggested that objects
could be ordered on a continuum running from personal to fungible. I'll Moving to the normative implications, Radin proposed a "twolevel" property system that offers differential protection to entitlements in accordance with their classification as personal or fungible.1 32 Furthermore, Radin suggested that her theory might imply an
obligation on the part of the government to "guarantee citizens all
entitlements necessary for personhood" and to ensure "that fungible
Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property, supra note 7, at 377.
Supra note 20.
127
Id. at 959-60. It is worth noting that Radin's project was motivated in part as a
response to the doninance of utilitarian theories of property and their celebration of the
market mechanism as a means for allocating resources. Id. at 958. Radin, by contrast,
argued that the market has inherent limitations and that certain entitlements should be
excluded from market exchange. This theme was more fully developed in Margaret Jane
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L, REv. 1849 (1987).
128
Radin, supra note 20, at 959.
125
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property of some people does not overwhelm the opportunities of the
rest to constitute themselves in [personal] property."' 33
Notwithstanding its ingenuity and importance, Radin's analysis
further obscured the concept of property. Radin implied that theorists could no longer simply refer to property as a generic relationship
among people with regard to objects. Rather, Radin's analysis requires careful scrutiny of the nature of objects subject to property
rights and the roles objects play in constituting the personalities of the
persons claiming them.
E.

Neo-Conceptualism and Utilitarianism

Most recently, a new body of scholarship has sought to recover
the conceptual coherence of property by joining traditional doctrines
with some basic utilitarian justifications. In an important series of articles, Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith sought to reintroduce some
coherence to property law by stressing the centrality of two basic features of property law: the in rem nature of property rights 134 and the
numerus clausus principle, under which property rights "must track a
limited number of standard forms."'1 5 Merrill and Smith observed
that "[w]hen property rights are created, third parties must expend
time and resources to determine the attributes of these rights, both to
'3 6
avoid violating them and to acquire them from present holders.'
Consequently, the creation of idiosyncratic property rights increases
the information costs property imposes on third parties.1 37 Standardi38
zation, on the other hand, reduces them.
I1
A

UNIFIED VALUE APPROACH TO PROPERTY

This Part has two aims. First, it isolates the core function around
which property theory is constructed. Second, it explains how property is designed to serve this core function. Here, it both sketches the
outlines of how basic property rules serve property goals and outlines
the limits of property law's usefulness. The central aim of this Part is
to present this Article's theory-that the institution of property is designed to create and defend the value that inheres in stable ownership. Property accomplishes this feat by creating and protecting the
relationship between a person and assets.

135

Id. at 990.
Merrill & Smith, Property/ContractInterface, supra note 4, at 780-89.
Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 4, at 4.

1-36

Id. at 8.
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It bears noting at the outset that this Article does not aspire to
create a radically different understanding of property; rather, it demonstrates that a coherent understanding of property can result from
rearranging elements of many of the theories discussed through the
years. Thus, the scope of this Article is to present an understanding of
property that is designed to justify what J.E. Penner labeled (using
terminology introduced by Joseph Raz) the individuation of property. 139 In other words, this Article shows what utility the creation of a
distinct branch of law called property serves.
A.

Overview: Property and Stability

This Section presents a more extensive analysis of the stability
value created by property. The conclusion is that a property system
with stable rights increases the value of assets to users (now owners)
and decreases the costs of obtaining and defending those assets. Furthermore, this Article posits that a universally accepted and centrally
policed property system provides the most cost-effective means of producing these benefits due to economies of scale. Finally, the Article
shows that, generally, the benefits provided by property systems increase with the stability of the property rights they create.
The institution of property is not the only utility-enhancing institution in the law, nor is the value of stable ownership the only value
that is-or should be-enhanced by legal institutions. This Article's
point of departure, however, is that the law is divided into numerous
legal fields such as property, torts, contracts, and tax in order to handle characteristically similar utility questions in common fashion. In
describing property, this Section discusses how property deals with
value-enhancing relationships regarding assets and, in particular, how
property increases value by creating and defending stable ownership.
As demonstrated in later Parts, the individuation of the field of property is important, because in addition to defending particular types of
value, property law is characterized by particular types of remedies,
140
making it an attractive branch of law for many claims
This Article follows in the footsteps of works by such luminaries as
Demsetz,1 41 Barzel,1 4 2 Steven Shavell, 143 Robert Ellickson,1 44 Carol
Rose, 145 and others in viewing property as aimed at enhancing utility,
139
See PENNER, supra note 30. Penner's work, unlike this one, rejects the contribution
of economic analysis of property. Id. at 63-67.
140
See infra Parts IV.D and VII.
141
See Demsetz, supra notes 107-10.
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See BARZEL, supra note 117.
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See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS
See Ellickson, supra note 74.
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but it introduces some subtle and important differences in the traditional perspectives. First, we focus on the utility-enhancing results of
ownership rather than possession. As shall be discussed, following in the
steps of Meir Dan-Cohen, 146 when the law of property creates a status
of owner, it generates value that would not exist absent a recognized
property relationship. Second, this Article emphasizes the importance of legal recognition of an owner as the ultimate value claimant
and of the restriction of property to certain types of assets rather than
to any legal relationship or any asset. These two facets of the value
theory are important to understanding why there is a distinct law of
property rather than a unified field of law dealing with all interactions
among people in society. Yet, notwithstanding these contributions of
the value theory, this Article still relies on key points developed by
other theorists, such as viewing property law as essential in creating
value through possession, reducing transaction costs for transferring
objects, enhancing incentives for investment in developing objects,
and providing a baseline for some types of contracts.
B.

The Value of Property to an Owner

This Section delineates the various ways in which stable ownership enhances the value an owner receives from an asset. Those uninterested in the details of how property enhances value for the
individual owner and for society may proceed to Part II.D.
In a world without property law, people would still have to use
objects, and they might still value some objects more than others.
They may even be able to maintain a degree of stable possession over
them. Each potential possessor of an object would then have to consider the following utility function before determining whether it
would be worthwhile to obtain possession. The following equation
represents the object's expected utility: U. Po * (So(p) - D(,) - Co. U.
represents the expected utility to be obtained from an object; P. is the
aggregate probability of retaining the object (represented as a percentage of the total life of the object during which the acquirer manages to retain possession); S.(p) is the use value of the object; Do is the
cost of defending the object from potential takers; and C. is the cost
of obtaining the object.
The utility function may also be expressed as the aggregate of the
utility to be obtained in any given period, over the sum of all of the
periods of ownership. This idea is represented by the following
notation:
u, = p,, (s,(p) - d) - c,
and
146

See Dan-Cohen, supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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(s,(p)- d,) -c,= U.

t=l
Here, u, represents the utility obtained by the owner in any given period, and UT represents the aggregate utility obtained over all periods.
Thus, UT is the equivalent of U. above. Similarly, p, is the probability
of retaining the object in any given period; s(p) is the use value of the
object in any given period; d, is the cost of defending the object from
potential takers during that period; and c, is the cost of obtaining the
147
object in that period.
It is evident, then, that the probability of retention and the use
value are variables that positively correlate with the owner's utility,
whereas the cost of obtaining and defending the object are negatively
correlated with the owner's utility. The first question for policymakers
is, therefore, how and to what extent the introduction of property law
is going to affect these variables. The model initially presumes that
policymakers have only one available option for instituting a property
law regime. Accordingly, they face a binary choice between having a
property law regime and not having a property law regime. Later, we
complicate the analysis by examining the issue of the ideal content of
property law.
Assume that a basic property system has three chief components.
First, it creates a certain legal status. This legal status provides that an
asset-a widget, for example-"belongs" to the owner. Second, the
legal system defines the meaning of this status. That is, it states that
when a widget belongs to the owner, the owner enjoys a given group
of rights, powers, and privileges. Third, the legal system attaches certain practical consequences to the violation of property rules. For instance, the legal system may provide for the punishment of
trespassers. It is not necessary for purposes of the argument here to
assume that all violations will be detected or punished.
What will be the effect of the institution of property on each of
the four variables discussed? Begin with C., the cost of obtaining objects. The hypothesized property system affects C. by altering the
transaction costs pertaining to two types of information: status information and secondary information that facilitates transactions. Naturally, the creation of status engenders a new type of information about
assets, i.e., to whom they belong. The creation of status, however, will
147
In describing the aggregate utility as the sum of individual owners' utilities, this
Article ignores the likelihood of externalities, both positive and negative. The assumption
of no externalities is, of course, highly unrealistic, and this topic is later revisited in this
Section. In addition, because the utility represented here is aggregated over various owners, there is no need to add a separate function for the utility of sale to higher-value
owners.
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likely have a very modest effect on information about assets. This is
because the creation of status alone does not lower an owner's defense costs. Without enforcement, one's status as owner has little independent meaning. Hence, the effect on cost is contingent in that it
relies upon the enforcement mechanism's effectiveness. Stated otherwise, the major effect on Co-the informational status engendered by
our hypothesized property system-relies on the system's effect on another variable-D, the cost of defending the object from possible
takers.
We will return to the subject of the cost of defending momentarily. First, however, it is important to discuss the secondary information effects of formalizing property as a legal right. The availability of
legal protection enables asset holders to share transactional information, such as the location of the holder, the holder's rights, and the
potential terms of exchange with the rest of the world. The availability of such information dramatically decreases the search and transaction costs for third parties. As a result, the overall cost of purchasing
property declines. Yet, a possible countervailing effect exists. In the
absence of effective protection of property, secrecy would be among
the principal defensive measures that asset holders could use to maintain possession. Suppression or concealment of information about assets would increase the search costs of potential takers, thereby
increasing the current holder's likelihood of keeping the asset. Thus,
absent enforcement measures, it is difficult to determine the net effect of a property system on the cost of obtaining assets. Once the
property system includes an enforcement mechanism, however, an information market should arise, which would cause the cost of obtaining objects to decrease.
Defensive costs (denoted D.), of course, are more directly impacted by the property system's enforcement provision. As public enforcement mechanisms are made available to private property owners,
property owners may substitute the public defensive mechanisms for
their private protection. The better the public defense, the lower the
private investments. Thus, central legal enforcement provides asset
holders with the ability to reduce defensive costs significantly. This
result obtains even if, as expected, legal enforcement of private property rights is less than 100% effective.
For similar reasons, legal enforcement of property rights should
increase the property owner's probability of retaining possession of
her property-Po. The heightened protection effected by legal enforcement makes it less likely that current owners would involuntarily
lose their assets. Note that the availability of status recognition and
legal enforcement will likely increase the number of voluntary asset
transfers in market transactions. Thus, the emergence of voluntary
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exchange may well shorten the average ownership term. But because
voluntary exchanges increase asset values (enhancing the utility of
both seller and buyer), the potential shortening of the ownership
term has a net beneficial effect.
The effect of a property system on use value, So(p), is also positive. However, it bears noting that the use value is a complex function. Various parameters-including use revenue, operating costs,
learning curves, interoperability among assets, and the ability to separate ownership from possession or operation-influence the use
value.' 4 The existence of a property system does not affect these parameters uniformly. Rather than posit and plot a separate use function showing the interlocking effects of these parameters, this Article
examines the broad effects produced by the property system.
Use revenue represents the gross stream of income derived from
an asset. It includes both pecuniary and nonpecuniary elements. Use
revenue may increase with the institution of legal enforcement. The
affordability of legal protection and the corresponding diminution of
reliance on self-help defensive measures should increase use of assets
and the corresponding revenue stemming from use. The emergence
of legal protection not only facilitates more open and frequent uses of
assets, it also makes possible the temporary separation of ownership
and possession. Without property protection, asset holders would be
extremely reluctant to surrender possession because possession would
be their only cognizable interest. Any concession of possession would
have to be accompanied by sufficient security measures to compensate
the asset holder for the impending risk of not having the asset returned. Potential possessors would be equally reluctant to provide adequate securities to the asset-holders, lest their securities never return.
Consequently, all property arrangements involving the separation of
ownership and possession or use, including lease, bailment, and licensing, would have to rely on barter. Such barters, however, would
be extremely rare and difficult to execute because mutually desirable
objects of the requisite value may not be available or delivery might be
practically impossible.
The possible voluntary decoupling of ownership and possession
(or use/operation) increases the use value of assets in several related
ways. First, it makes possible the temporary transfer of assets to
higher-value users who cannot afford to purchase the assets. One example of this phenomenon involves the common practice of taxi cab
148
In principle, depreciation and obsolescence may also affect use value. However,
because this Article defines P. as the probability of retaining an asset over an asset's life, we
need not concern ourselves with obsolescence and depreciation. Because both obsolescence and depreciation determine the life term of relevant assets, they are already incorporated into P0.
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owners in major cities to giving use rights to non-owner drivers.
Leases of manufacturing equipment or commercial and residential
real estate provide another example. 149 These widespread practices
would not have been nearly as ubiquitous, however, without a system
of recognition and enforcement of private property rights allowing for
the temporary relinquishment of possession. The taxi cab driver will
likely be more skilled at producing revenue from the cab, while the
owner is likely more skilled at managing the fleet. The driver's temporary possession thereby enhances revenue produced by the asset. Second, the ability to transfer assets to more skillful users almost
invariably entails a reduction in operating costs. The skilled machinery operator, for example, will almost certainly be able to run the
equipment at a lower cost than the less skilled owner. Together, these
two factors-higher revenues and lower costs-point to greater profits
resulting from temporary separations of ownership and possession.
Stable property ownership also allows for increased net use value
resulting from learning how best to use an asset. The utility-enhancing effects of stability with respect to learning curves may arise in a
number of different contexts. Consider an expensive asset with a
large number of attributes, such as an automobile. Over time and
because of repeated use, the automobile operator will learn the various tics unique to the vehicle. She will learn, for example, that the
brakes respond best to moderate pressure, while the accelerator pedal
works best when lightly touched. Acquiring this knowledge, through
time, enhances the operator's ability to extract the vehicle's maximum
utility. Of course, the benefits of learning positively correlate with the
asset's complexity. Thus, for example, when a company's assembly
line is comprised of various pieces of machinery, stability in the right
to possess produces increased efficient use over time. Naturally, one
cannot expect the company's employees to realize the full economic
potential of the machinery right away. Indeed, the operation of complicated machinery often requires long training periods, and typically
machinery cannot be put to use right away. The acquiring company
must let its employees familiarize themselves with each production
unit in order for them to understand how it interacts with other
pieces in the line. Stable ownership provides the employees with the
opportunity to acquire this knowledge. One would expect that without longer-term possession encouraged by property protection, the investment in complex assets that require learning would significantly
decrease.
Another advantage of stable ownership is compatibility. As the
ownership period of various assets extends, potential interoperability
149

See infra Part VII.C for further discussions of leases and property.

CORIVELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:531

affects the ability to extract utility from other assets. The utility of
purchasing a particular car seat, for instance, will be affected not only
by the likelihood of continued possession of the seat, but also by the
expected possessory life of the car itself. The property system's enhancement of the value of one asset can therefore be expected to
have positive multiplier effects as the increased value spreads to other,
interoperable assets.
Finally, the property system may add to the asset's use value simply by bestowing the status of ownership, even where there is no
change in the expected ability to defend the asset. That is, an asset's
owner is likely to receive some value from the realization that society
recognizes her as the object's rightful owner. This value, labeled
"ownership value" by Meir Dan-Cohen, 150 is wholly separate from the
value created by central enforcement. Consider home ownership, for
example. The effect of the property system extends beyond the enhanced value resulting from secured possession or even sentimental
attachment. Ownership status itself creates independent value for the
homeowner) 5 1 Dan-Cohen illustrates the value of "delight in ownership" by describing the utility owners derive from bottlecap collections
or collections of otherwise worthless items; he posits that in these
cases the collector "does not value owning these items because she
values the items, but instead values the items because she owns
52
them."1
C.

The Value of Property to Society

Thus far, this Article has shown that a property system may enhance the utility of objects to their owners. For policyrnakers, however, the creation of a property system is not solely related to its effect
on individuals. Rather, policymakers must determine whether the
public creation of a society-wide property system enhances utility relative to the private and public alternatives, including the possibility of
no property system at all.
The first step in analyzing whether a society-wide property system
is worthwhile is to extend the analysis conducted previously from the
level of the individual to society. Tackling the problem at a societal
level reveals that certain network externalities, 15 3 free-riding
150

Dan-Cohen, supra note 20, at 1.

151
152

Id.

1d, at --4. Dan-Cohen would likely disavow this Article's utilitarian analysis of ownership value. Dan-Cohen's account is proudly nonconsequentialist and nonreductionist.
Id at 1-2. He analyzes ownership in relation to constitution of the self, and while he
recognizes that ownership is constitutive of value, to him this value is tightly linked to an
ontological conception of the self. Id.
153 A network externality exists when the utility a given user derives from the consumption of a good depends upon the number of other users in the same network. Michael L.
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problems,' 54 and economies of scale 1 5 5 and scope15 6 suggest both that
the public definition of property status and the public enforcement of
property rights should be provided.
A property system can be analogized to a communication network, whose value increases with each additional subscriber while the
corresponding value each subscriber derives from the network also
increases. To begin with, the utility of property status is directly related to the degree to which the property system is known in, and
used, by society. Naturally, the more widespread and accepted a property system is by society, the more the system enhances property status.
As the number of people aware of and respecting the property system
grows, the number of sources of property information also grows. In
addition, there is an increased likelihood that social conventions will
develop around the labeling of and respect for property status. Conversely, as the number of persons failing to respect the property system shrinks, the likelihood of a competing system sending
confounding signals about property status decreases. In this way, a
1 57
property system is analogous to a communication network.
Moreover, property status is prey to free-riding. Once property
rights are defined by an influential actor such that one's rights are
accepted throughout society, even those not paying for the service of
property definition will be able to use the concept of property. If, for
example, there is widespread agreement in society that there is such a
thing as a property right and that it is obtained by investing labor in
an object, everyone who invests labor in an object will likely have her
property rights respected, even if she has made no investment in advancing the concept of property rights. A legal property system, in
other words, is like many other parts of the legal system in that it can
be viewed as a public good.' 5 8 Consumption of its services is
nonrivalrous, and there is no effective way of excluding consumers
Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON.
REv. 424, 424 (1985). Although we are primarily concerned with positive network externalities (as in the decreased cost per user in most telecommunications systems), networks
can also have negative externalities (as in the increased cost per user on an overcrowded
freeway).
154
SeeRoBERT S. PINDYCK& DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMiCs 665 (2d ed. 1992).
155 For our purposes, economies of scale are increases in the efficiency of a system
(decreases in the pro rata cost of the goods or services it delivers) resulting from an increase in the system's size (e.g., the number of users). See id. at 231-32.
156 For our purposes, economies of scope are increases in the efficiency of a system
(decreases in the pro rata cost of the goods or services it delivers) resulting from an increase in its scope (e.g., the range of goods or services provided), Id. at 220-23.
157 Notwithstanding the presence of network externalities, there may be a role for
competition in defining property rights. However, a full examination of the question is
beyond the scope of this Article.
158 Cf Rex E. Lee, Address, The American Courts as Public Goods: Who Should Pay the Costs
of Litigation? 34 CATH. U. L. Rhv. 267 (1985).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:531

from using its services. Indeed, in describing public goods as "instances in which marginal private net product falls short of marginal
social net product, because incidental services are performed to third
parties from whom it is technically difficult to exact payment," Alfred
59
Pigou had in mind, inter alia, intellectual property law.1
Public enforcement of property systems will also often constitute
a public good. Enforcing property rights by monitoring infringements, apprehending transgressors, and prosecuting and punishing
violators has the effect of strengthening property value. Generally,
property owners cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefit of enforcement through free-riding.1 60 Notably, where property owners
can be excluded from enforcement benefits-for instance, where enforcement is carried out by social punishments in a tightly knit community-there will be less need for public provision of a property
system. t 61 This insight is at the core of Demsetz's observation that
social interaction regarding property must become sufficiently expensive before a public property system is worthwhile. 1" 2 The result is
that, in most cases, the enforcement of property rights is a public
good that the state should centrally provide.1 6 3
159
See ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 183-84 (transaction ed.
2002). The public goods defense of intellectual property rights has proved controversial.
See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Cpyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REv. 281, 340-50 (1970) (arguing against extending copyright protection to computer programs); Benjamin G. Damstedt, Note,
Limiting Locke: A NaturalLawJust/icationfor the FairUse Doctrine,112 YALE L.J. 1179,1219-21
(2003) (arguing that Lockean principles justify limiting intellectual property rights); Jack
Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61
Am. ECON. REv. 561, 573 (1971) (arguing that invention is encouraged by the pecuniary
benefits arising from the ability to distribute new information); Roger E. Meiners & Robert
J. Staaf, Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks: Property or Monopoly?, 13 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y
911, 939-40 (1990) (arguing that intellectual property rights are property rights, not monopoly rights); Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of
Property Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'V 817, 855-65 (1990) (arguing that
"intellectual property rights have no legitimate moral grounding").
160
Law enforcement officials could refuse to extend protection to certain types of
property owners. But unless the method for refusing can be readily discerned by violators,
all property owners will earn the benefits. This is because violators will not know in advance whether the property right they are violating is subject to public punishment or not,
and they will therefore assess the risk equally across all assets, whether publicly protected
or not. For an example of how defense mechanisms that are externally unobservable protect all owners, see Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, Measuring Positive Externalitiesfrom Unobservable Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack 113 Q.J. EcoN. 43, 44 (1998)
(discussing and measuring the positive externalities of Lojack). Interestingly, where there
is systematic bias, a parallel private enforcement may very well arise to provide substitute
private property protection.
161

See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How NEICHBORS SErTLE DIsPUTEs

(1991).
162
See Demsetz, supra note 107, at 350 ("[P]roperty rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than the cost of internalization.").
See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
163
NATIONS 653-766 (E. Cannan ed., 1937) (suggesting that because of certain market fail-
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Property definition and enforcement may also benefit from economies of scale. Enforcing property rights involves monitoring violations, as well as apprehending, prosecuting, andjudging transgressors.
Given that a single transgressor typically threatens multiple property
owners, centralized enforcement of property rights, which is more easily achieved by the state, could produce these goods more cheaply. A
similar analysis applies to apprehension. While monitoring aims at
deterring transgressors from carrying out their schemes, and apprehension at incapacitating them, centralized apprehension mechaCentralized
nisms should also prove more cost-effective.
and
repeat
violators
cost
of
prosecuting
the
will
reduce
apprehension
effectively
enable the specialization of agents to pursue violators more
than individual property owners. In particular, the prosecuting and
judging of offenders rely on expertise and are characterized by economies of scale. Both prosecuting and judging require proficient knowledge of the legal system and adequate familiarity with the facts of each
individual case. Furthermore, judicial decisions give new content and
meaning to property rights and thus affect parties beyond those involved in the immediate dispute.
Additionally, economies of scope may exist between monitoring
and apprehension. Various monitoring skills reduce the cost of apprehending transgressors. Likewise, familiarity with the physical and
social setting of a given community can considerably lower the cost
and increase the effectiveness of deterring violations of property
rights and apprehending violators. Therefore, from an economic perspective, there are advantages to having the same agents perform both
monitoring and apprehension.
Some may argue that the property system as a whole produces
negative utility, i.e., it diminishes social welfare on the whole. Such

ures, the administration ofjustice should be provided by a civil government); Lawrence B.
Solum, Alternative Court Structures in the Future of the CaliforniaJudiciary: 2020 Vision, 66 S.
CAL. L. REv. 2121, 2173-74 (1993) (arguing that enforcement of a private property system
through a public dispute resolution system is a public good that should be provided by the
state and not by aggrieved individuals seeking private enforcement through vigilantism); cf
Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 28 (1982)
("Because private-sector decisionmakers will not necessarily supply public goods at efficient
levels, such goods may be logical candidates for public-sector production."); James M.
Buchanan & Milton Z. Kafoglis, A Note on Public Goods Supply, 53 Am. ECON. REV. 403,
412-13 (1963) (concluding that if a municipal government ceased to provide police or fire
departments and instead people hired these services, the "total resource outlay on providing protection to life and property would be greater than under collectivization"). But see
Stuart Banner, TransitionsBetween Property Regimes 31,J. LEGAL STUD. 359, 363 (2002) (arguing that enforcement of a property system may not be a public good because the organizers of the system can deny the benefits of the system to certain people by refusing to
enforce those people's rights).
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claims, however, are difficult to reconcile with the empirical data. 6 4
Numerous studies have demonstrated that property systems are crucial to the macroeconomic development of countries. 165 Indeed,
these works show that long-term economic growth is intimately tied
with the creation and defense of stable property rights. 166 Moreover,
a recent study shows that stable property institutions are more important to economic growth than contractual ones.' 67 Consistent with

this Article's theory, the study suggests that the property system is crucial to encouraging societal welfare by creating and defending stable
ownership rights in property. 168 Finally, such scholars as Douglass
North have provided the theoretical groundwork to the empirical
work. 169
A far more interesting question, however, is what the optimal
level of property protection should be. Admittedly, the state may provide more property protection than is socially optimal-and indeed, it
may even be doing so now. Unfortunately, it is not easy to measure
precisely the cost of providing a property system or property protection in any given case or the precise utility of property vis-d-vis any
particular asset or owner class. And while the tradeoff of system utility

versus transaction cost has not merited extensive examination in general property scholarship, the cost-benefit analysis has been discussed
extensively in the intellectual property literature.1 7° In the classic
treatment of the subject, William Nordhaus demonstrated that the op164
Hernando de Soto, Preface to THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT, at xiii
(Edgardo Buscaglia et al. eds., 1997) ("Those nations that have succeeded in developing a
market-oriented economy are not coincidentally those that have recognized the need for
and secured widespread property rights protected by just law."); Paul G. Mahoney, The
Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might be Right, 30J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 523 (2001)

("The ... results . . . suggest that the strong association between secure property and

contract rights and growth is causal, and not simply a consequence of simultaneity.");
ToddJ. Zywicki, The Rule of Law, Freedom, and Prosperity, 10 SuP. CT. ECON. REV.1, 22 (2002)
("The documented effect of increasing rule of law values on economic growth is robust.
Individuals are more willing to invest in economic growth where property rights are stable ....");DANI RODRICK, INSTITUTIONS FOR HIGH-QuALITY GROWTH: WHAT THEY ARE AND
HOW TO ACQUIRE THEM 5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7540,
2000) ("[E]stablishment of secure and stable property rights [was] a key element in the
rise of the West and the onset of modern economic growth."), available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/w7540.
165

Id.

166
167

Id.

See

DARON ACEMOGLU & SIMON JOHNSON, UNBUNDLING INSTITUTIONS

33-35 (Nat'l

Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9934, 2003) (demonstrating that property
rights institutions are more important determinants of economic performance than contracting institutions), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9934.
168
169

See id.

See Douglass C. North, Dealingwith a Non-Ergodic World: InstitutionalEconomics, Property Rights, and the Global Environment, 10 DUKE ENVrL. L. & POL'v F. 1, 3 (1999).
170
See generallyWILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 76-86 (1969).
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timal duration of patent protection balances the utility of incentives
for innovation against the costs produced by monopoly-induced deadweight loss.' 7 ' Unfortunately, determining where this balance lies in
the real world has proved to be elusive.' 72 By the same token, it is
difficult to imagine empirical studies that would accurately identify
the precise tradeoff necessary to achieve the optimal level of property
protection.
D.

Asset Definition

So far, the discussion regarding the utility of a legal property system has omitted reference to the question of which assets to include
in the system. As noted earlier, property is not the only field of law,
and not every asset is suitable for property protection. The value theory of property suggests the following central limitation: only assets
for which protection of stable ownership will enhance social welfare
should come under the aegis of property law. As society changes, the
value derived from different assets is transformed, and therefore the
objects of property law will change over time. Similarly, as the cost of
providing property rights for asset or owner classes changes, the net
utility of providing for property rights will change as well.
The theory of property as protecting stable ownership value instantly suggests two types of assets not suitable for protection under
the property system: nonmarket goods and goods for which there is
no in rem protection. Nonmarket goods are goods that will not appear on the market due to lack of demand (because no one derives
any utility from them) or lack of supply (because they may not be costeffectively protected). An example of an asset for which there is currently no demand is a torn CD wrapper. An asset that may not currently be cost-effectively protected is fair weather. The second
category excluded contains goods for which there is no in rem protection. An example of a good falling within this category is a beautiful
singing voice. The voice qua voice may not be appropriated by third
parties.
A different limitation on assets' suitability for property protection
stems from asset size and the threat of asset fragmentation. Here, the
withholding of property protection is not categorical but individualSee id.
In the wake of Nordhaus' early investigations, many others attempted to tackle the
problem of optimal patent duration. See, e.g., Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal
Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RANDJ. ECON. 106, 106 (1990) ("When patent policy is viewed
to be a choice of patent breadth as well as patent length, we find that the optimal length
may easily be infinite. The appropriate margin on which patent policy should operate may
not be patent length, but rather patent breadth."); F.M. Scherer, Nordhaus' Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation,62 AM. ECON. REv. 422, 422-27 (1972) (proposing a modification to Nordhaus' original attempts at modeling optimal patent life).
171

1 72
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ized. Take ownership in land, for instance. Needless to say, land ownership is a recognized property interest, in principle. However, if the
interest is devised to too many devisees or allowed to descend to too
many heirs, it may become so fragmented that it loses virtually all of its
value. Imagine that Blackacre is a sixteen-acre (2,722.5 ft.2) estate
that, after several generations of partitioning and re-partitioning, is
divided into 1,249 separate parcels, each less than 2.2 square feet.
Practically speaking, the small parcels are unlikely to prove to be commercially useful in any fashion, and it is difficult to imagine the development of any residential use of or sentimental value to this small
space. In short, as the asset becomes too small, it is unlikely to have
value. In addition, as the asset becomes too small to have any value
created or defended with stable ownership, it moves beyond the range
of the legal property system. The loss of value in such cases is quite
close to the problem Michael Heller dubbed the "tragedy of the anticommons."' 173 In Heller's examples, Blackacre is not physically divided; rather each of the devisees and descendants receives an increasingly small ownership share of the whole.174 Thus, each transferee, by
virtue of being a co-owner, has veto power over any decision about the
use or transfer of the asset. 175 The creation of multiple veto powers,
with the attendant holdout problem, often leads to insoluble asset
lock-ins and thus causes underutilization of assets. 176 Whether the asset is divided physically, or whether its ownership is divided among
many owners, the solution is clear: either recombine the microparcels,
or reaggregate the microshares of ownership. Either way, the legal
system should discourage stability in ownership until the asset is significant enough that there is value in its stable ownership.
Yet another category of assets unsuitable for property rights resuits from the cost of providing property protection. One current example of such an asset is ideas. Under the prevailing view, there are
no property rights in pure ideas partially because the cost of protection would outweigh the benefit. 177 It must be borne in mind,
173
Heller, Anti-Commons, supra note 4,at 624 ("When too many owners have [the]
privileges of use, the resource is prone to overuse-a tragedy of the commons.").
174
175

See id. at 651.

See id. at 652-53.
See id. at 653-54.
177
See Galanis v. Proctor & Gamble Corp., 153 F. Supp. 34, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) ("The
general rule of law is that a mere idea is not property.... ."); Stephen C. Carlson, The Law
and Economics of Star Pagination,2 GEO. MASON L. REv. 421, 432 (student ed. 1995) ("[T]he
administrative costs of defining the idea are quite high. . . . [This is because]
[dietermining the scope of the protected idea would be problematic."); Douglas YBarbo,
On Legal Protectionfor Electronic Texts: A Reply to ProfessorPatterson andJudge Birch, 5 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 195, 216 n. 52 ("[Tlhe high administrative cost of protecting ideas is no doubt
important; it is simply too difficult to determine an idea's source, e.g., whether it is original
or not.").
176
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though, that the cost of property protection depends in large measure
on available technology; moreover, technological advances may make
it cost-effective to create new property rights in as of yet unprotected
resources. Technology, then, determines not only the protection's
feasibility, but also its effectiveness. The invention of barbed wire, for
example, enabled farmers near perfect protection against roaming
cattle, consequently enhancing the value of their land.1 78 Indeed, it is
quite feasible that an asset will become a suitable subject of property
law primarily due to reductions in the cost of property protection,
rather than due to any changes in the asset's revenue-producing capacity. Conversely, the Napster cases and the digital information
revolution seem to suggest that an asset may cease to be a suitable subject of property law because of an increase in the cost of protecting
it. 179

In subsequent sections, this Article demonstrates how property
law identifies and restricts property protection to the right kind of
assets. 18 0
E.

Property and Contract

A final point should be made about the relationship between contract and property in our understanding of property. As previously
noted, modern economic analysis presumes that property is the leftover category when contract is exhausted. 8 1 Coasian economic analysis notes that in a zero transaction cost world, people concerned with
the use of a particular asset can arrive at perfectly contingent contracts that efficiently dispose of the asset and render property irrelevant.18 2 Thus, the standard pose of such theorists is that of Barzel,
who views property as merely setting up default allocations and rights
to provide the basis for further bargaining."' To be sure, transaction
costs will bar further transacting in some cases, and in such cases

178
TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 29-30
(1991) (describing the impact barbed wire had on ranchers in the Western United States
when introduced in the 1870s).
179 See Note, Exploitative Publishers, Untrustworthy Systems, and the Dream of a Digital
Revolution for Artists, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2438, 2455 (2001) (suggesting that "peer-to-peer
file-sharing technology like Napster's demonstrates the implausibility of street-level enforcement of copyright law generally"); see also David D. Haddock & Lynne Kiesling, The
Black Death and Property Rights, 31 J. LEG. Siru. 545 (2002) (discussing dropping of assets
from property system as a result of the Black Plague).
180 See infra Part MA.
181 See supra text accompanying notes 115-25.
182
BARZEL, supra note 117, at 7.
183
Id. at 33-37.
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property rules will remain dispositive.' 8 4 The bulk of analysis, however, is not devoted to these residual cases.
In this Article's view, this analysis of the relative importance of
contract and property has matters precisely reversed. Typically, an asset has many potential claimants, and perfectly contingent contracts
would need to be negotiated among a large number of parties to
render property rules irrelevant. Recall our earlier example of the
conveyance of an automobile. While the buyer and seller can likely
order all of their affairs by contract, they almost certainly cannot extend their contractual network very far into the rest of the world. Indeed, often so many parties would have to be bargained with that
contractual solutions are unavailable, and property rules ultimately
determine the object's contribution to societal welfare. In other
words, only rarely can bargaining be relied upon to produce the efficient use and allocation of assets; in most cases, property law will determine whether social welfare is maximized. Consequently, the rules
of property must be carefully tailored to maximize the value produced
by property institutions.
III
THROUGH THE VALUE PRISM

Having presented the basics of this Article's theory, it is fitting in
this Part to acknowledge its intellectual debt to some of the preexisting contributions to property law. This Article's unified theory of
value has many theoretic antecedents. As noted previously, a value
component in property theory is present in the writings of Locke,
Marx, and numerous others, and more recently, in those of Radin and
Barzel.18 5 Each employs value in a different way. Similarly, this Article not only breaks away from the prior use of value, but in a significant departure from current conceptualist scholarship, the value is
utilized as the key component in unifying property as a legal institution. In this Part, the theory developed here is compared with other
existing theories ranging from neo-conceptualism to law and
economics.
A.

Labor Theory of Value

The differences between this Article's use of value and that of
Locke and Marx should be readily apparent. Although Locke and
Marx proffered radically divergent theories, both viewed value as the
184

See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Anti-Property, 102 MICH.

L. REv. 1, 5 (2003) (discussing how transaction costs may bar further transfer of property

ights).
185

See supraParts IA, IC, I.D.
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connecting link between labor and ownership.1 s6 The critical premise
in their writings was that labor enhances the value of objects, a commonality leading them both to argue that the laborer is entitled to the
added value component. 187 Locke used this reasoning to provide a
natural rights basis for ownership; 188 Marx used it to argue for empowerment of the proletariat.1 9 The labor theory of value was once very
influential; its importance, however, has declined. As should be clear
to the reader, the value theory presented in this Article does not rely
on the labor theory, and the labor component of value has no independent importance here.
B.

Value and Personhood

The contrast between this Article's approach and that of Radin
warrants more elaboration. Working from a personhood perspective,
Radin divided the world of objects into two categories: nonfungible
(or personal) and fungible. 190 Nonfungible goods are those that are
instrumental in constituting their owners' personalities. 19 1 As a result,
nonfungible objects, such as a wedding ring, have a special value for
their owners above and beyond the object's market value. 19 2 Fungible
objects, by contrast, lack uniqueness and serve no purpose in constituting the self. 9 3 Radin suggested that property law should track this
distinction and treat goods differentially based on their classification
as personal or fungible. 194 For example, Radin proposed to restrict
injunctive relief, or property rule protection, to cases involving personal goods and to offer only compensatory damages, or liability rule
protection, in all other cases.1 95 Furthermore, while Radin acknowledged that owners may ascribe idiosyncratic value to fungible objects,
she derided this phenomenon as "object fetishism" that should not be
condoned.I%
186

See supra Part I.A.
Id. For an overview of the Marxian labor theory of value, see Fernando Vianello,
Labour Theory of Value, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: MARXIAN ECONOMICS 233 (John Eatwell et al.
eds., 1990).
188
LocKE, supra note 22.
189 See KARL MARX, supra note 23.
190
Radin, supra note 20, at 959-60.
191
Id. at 960.
192
Id. at 959.
193
See id. at 959-60, 986.
194
Id.
195
See id. at 988 ("[T]here would be a nice simplicity in hypothesizing that personal
property should be protected by property rules and that fungible property should be protected by liability rules.").
196 See id. at 961 (arguing that the idiosyncratic value people might ascribe to fungible
property does not deserve the same level of protection as personal property because "anyone who lives only for material object-s is considered not to be a well- developed person,
but rather to be lacking some important attribute of humanity").
187
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The model presented here sheds new light on Radin's theory and
permits the translation of some of Radin's insights into the language
of an economic approach. In essence, Radin's insight regarding the
distinction between "personal" or "nonfungible" and "fungible" property may be viewed as a subset to a larger phenomenon: the gap between reserve price and market price. This gap may be due to the
to what Radin calls "self-constitution" or
sentimental reasons related
"personal embodiment." 197 For example, it may be the case that when
a wedding ring is lost, the loss "causes pain that cannot be relieved by
the object's replacement."' 98 In cases of sentimental attachment, the
owner finds in the asset emotional utility not accessible to other market participants and, therefore, not reflected in the market price. In
other words, the price at which the owner will agree to sell the asset
(the reserve price) will exceed the price that ordinary market participants will pay (the market price).
Other elements besides sentimental value may also account for
this gap. An owner, for example, may have a unique skill that allows
her to extract greater utility from a rare commercial asset. For instance, Alice may be a musician particularly adept at playing period
harpsichords from the early 18th century. Because the market for
such harpsichords is exceptionally thin and Alice's ability to extract
utility is exceptionally high, if Alice's harpsichord is destroyed her loss
may well exceed the catalogue price of the harpsichord. Goods whose
enjoyment necessitates a learning period provide a different example.
Consider again the automobile with the oversensitive acceleration
pedal; the learned skill regarding the automobile's operation creates a
unique ability in the owner to extract utility from the asset at a low
cost. As with the case of sentimental value, the essential feature of all
these assets is that they have unique qualities and, therefore, lack perfect market substitutes. This lack of substitutes engenders a rational
gap between the owner's reserve price and the market price.
An important distinction must be made here between the rational values that inhere in stable ownership, on the one hand, and
the misperceptions in value that are often used to exemplify the "endowment effect" on the other. The endowment effect causes individuals to value goods in their possession more than the identical goods in
someone else's possession. 199 At its most basic level, the endowment
effect may be viewed as a decisional heuristic that is only sometimes
rational. Thus, for example, participants in one famous study were
randomly awarded lottery tickets with a potential $50 payoff or $3 in
Id. at 958.
Id. at 959.
199 See, e.g., Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, I J.
BlEviAv. & ORG. 39, 44 (1980) (discussing the endowment effect theory).
197
198
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cash. 20 0 The lottery recipients were then given the opportunity to sell
the lottery tickets for $3, and the cash recipients the chance to buy the
lottery tickets for $3.201I Remarkably, while 38% of the cash recipients
opted to buy lottery tickets, a whopping 82% of lottery ticket recipients rejected the cash offers and kept their tickets. 20 2 This disparity in
perceived value of the lottery ticket depended only on possession,
leading the study's authors to label such differing perceptions the "endowment effect."203 At least in this experiment, the endowment effect
reflects a decisionmaking quirk or a misperception rather than any
rational perception of value. By contrast, sometimes the valuation embodied in the endowment effect reflects a rational assessment that "a
bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." As Richard Posner noted,
persons in possession of an object may capitalize potential replace20 4
ment costs in its valuation where the object lacks ready substitutes.
Indeed, even where the object has close substitutes, the development
of habit and familiarity, or sentimental connection, may create rational idiosyncratic value. 20 5 Likewise, owners and possessors may
hold more accurate information regarding the object's value.
The value theory developed in this Article addresses all the situations in which a rational gap exists between the owner's reserve price
and the market price. The emphasis the theory places on the value of
stable ownership implies, inter alia, greater protection to people who
derive unique value from assets. Notably, two effects of legal property
rights-status conferral and enforcement-not only protect the
unique value, but also facilitate the creation of such value by enabling
owners to develop certain value-enhancing expectations and patterns
of behavior.
Before turning to the differences between this Article's and Radin's understandings of value, a significant point of convergence must
be recognized. Radin's important insight is that an inquiry into how
owners relate to an asset is central to property analysis.20 6 Radin's
treatment expanded preexisting legal analysis by highlighting the
need to account for how people value objects irrespective of the legal
protection afforded the object's possession. Consequently, in evaluat200
Jack L. Knetsch &J.A. Sinden, Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparityin Measures of Value, 99 Q.J. ECON. 507, 512 (1984).
201 Id.

202
203
204
205

Id. at 513.

Id. at 518.
RicuRARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 95-96 (5th ed. 1998).
Where there are only close, but not identical substitutes, substantial costs may be
involved in learning how to enjoy a substitute item's full value, whereas all such costs in the
currently possessed item have already been sunk. Consequently, the marginal cost of continuing to use the possessed item will no longer include the cost of learning how to use it,
while such costs will continue to be reflected in market prices.
See Radin, supra note 20, at 959-60.
206
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ing the desirability of property law, it is necessary to note the broader
20 7
network of valuable relationships between objects and owners.
However, the conception of value presented here diverges from
Radin's in several important respects. First, Radin's account recognizes no independent importance in the economic value of stable
ownership. 20 8 Radin is merely concerned with a special category of
objects that promotes the owner's sense of self.20 9 Thus, Radin's use
of value is much more limited. Second, and perhaps most importantly, Radin's use of value involves a normative value judgment-she
believes that idiosyncratic value is desirable only with respect to
nonfungible (personal) goods; in all other cases, she rejects it as object "fetishism."2 10 The account of value developed in this Article, by
contrast, is descriptive. No judgments regarding the desirability or
provenance of idiosyncratic value are made-its existence simply recognized and its value protected. Consequently, Radin's view lacks the
explanatory power of property law that this account offers. Finally, for
Radin, value provides a means for creating a particular subset of property-nonfungible goods. 211 Here, value plays a much broader rolethe unifying theme for all property law.
C.

Value and Economic Property

Barzel made a different contribution to the academic discourse
on value in property. 2 12 Barzel preceded us in placing value in the
center of property. Indeed, in some ways, Barzel's theory may be
viewed as a radical version of our property theory. The touchstone of
Barzel's analysis is "economic rights," a very broad conception that
leads him to view the role of the law as almost trivial. 213 To him, the
ability to derive value from an asset constitutes an economic property
right. 2 1 4 Law functions merely to recognize or fail to recognize this
ability. 2 15 In keeping with the tradition of Coase, Barzel views contracts as the primary legal institution for extracting value, with prop2 16
erty serving as a mere background for exchange.
207 Notwithstanding these criticisms, this model does incorporate some of Radin's
insights.
208
Radin, sup-a note 20, at 957-59.
209
See id.at 957 (explaining that her article only "explores the relationship between
).
property and personhood .
210
See id. at 961.
211
See id. at 959-61.
212
See supra Part I.C. and accompanying notes.
213 BA RZL, supra note 117, at 3 ("Economic rights are the end ... whereas legal rights
are the means to achieve the end .... I am concerned primarily with economic rights.
Legal rights play a primarily supporting role.").
214
215
216

See id. at 3.
id. at 4.
Id. at 33.
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A brief discussion of Barzel's approach to theft provides a good
overview of his property theory. Barzel views ownership as residual
claimancy on the value derived from an asset. 217 The legality of the

claimancy is of no consequence to Barzel.2 18 Thus, for example, an
automobile is "owned" not only by Betty, whose legal "ownership" is
registered with the state, but also by any person who has the potential
to realize value in the asset. The list of such people, in Barzel's view,
may be endless. 2 19 Even legally owned assets generate "value spillovers" for third parties, and all potential value claimants vie for the
opportunity to extract value from an asset. As the residual claimant,
Betty-who is the legal owner of the automobile-has only a limited
right to appropriate the value that "remains" in the automobile after
other claimants, including thieves like Charles, satisfy their claims on
the automobile. 220 Barzel does not ignore the law. But to him, the
law only affects the relative positions of the multiple claimants vis-A-vis
one another, making value extraction easier for some and more difficult for others.22 1 Thus, legal protection may "enhance" the value
held by a specific owner and change the relative positions of the various "owners" vis-A-vis one another, but it plays still strictly a secondary
role.

222

Barzel's view fails to take full account of legal property rights.
The property system, in our view, not only allocates value among
claimants; the property system also creates new value. As shown previously, the creation of the status of legal property, in and of itself, enhances asset value. Yet, property law clearly does not confer the same
status on all potential claimants of assets, whom Barzel refers to as
"owners." The point and purpose of property law is to separate rightful owners from unlawful claimants, and it is only for the former that
property status creates value. Moreover, as Barzel acknowledges, the
provision of legal enforcement further enhances the value of assets for
their owners. 223 As will be discussed later, legal enforcement of property rights is designed to keep assets in the hands of legally recognized
owners by deterring nonconsensual takings by making them prohibitively costly. 224 Of course, the legal system cannot guarantee a detec-

tion rate of one hundred percent-some nonconsensual abuses of
Id. at 3-9.
Id. at 141 ("The lack of legal rights may reduce the value of [property rights], but it
does not nullify them.").
219
Id. at 3 ("The residual claimancy from an asset or an operation is often shared by
several individuals.").
See id. at 141.
220
221
Id. at 141-42.
222
Id. at 4.
223
Id. at 141.
See infra Part IV.C.
224
217
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property will go unpunished. 225 Nevertheless, the legal system can offset imperfect detection by imposing harsher penalties to appre226
hended offenders.
To be sure, some of Barzel's insights, though contrary to legalcentric scholarship, cannot be denied. Barzel is correct in noting that
even after the law defines ownership, assets continue to have spillover
227
effects such that value is still available to many other claimants.
Moreover, Barzel is right in stating that the law is simply one of many
possible tools involved in protecting an asset's value. 228 The fact that
the law identifies Betty as the owner of her automobile does not prevent Charles from successfully stealing her car when Betty absentmindedly leaves the key on the front seat. The protection offered by
the law is limited to the ability to invoke the law enforcement system,
and even this ability is often limited. The result, which is discussed in
the next Section, is that legal protection is neither absolute nor
costless. 229 As will be shown, there may be imes where it is not costeffective to rely upon the law of property to defend value.
Yet, more broadly, this Article rejects Barzel's approach to the
domain of legal property. The conception of property in this Article
is one in which a legal property system creates and protects substantial
value. For this reason, in focusing solely on the contractually allocated value in assets (or what he terms the "economic rights" in property),230 Barzel eliminates the essential contribution of a legal
framework to the value that inheres in property. Here, property law
does more than simply allocate and recognize value produced by "eco225
Barzel makes much of the fact that even those not legally designated to have any
status regarding an asset-such as thieves-may nevertheless illicitly enjoy some of the
value of an asset. BARZEL, supra note 117, at 141. Certainly, it is true that the harm occasioned by some property violations may simply be too small to warrant legal action. Thus,
it makes no economic sense for homeowners to pursue legal action against the occasional
driver who trespasses on their driveway to make a three-point turn. Nonconsensual tasting
of fruit in supermarkets also probably falls in this category. See icL at 6. The fact that not all
violations of property rights are litigated or prosecuted, however, does not transform the
violators into owners of the relevant property. The fruit-tasters do not enjoy any legal
protection for their ill-gotten gains, or any cognizable legal status. They have no stability in
ownership to rely on; indeed, they have no legally recognized "ownership" at all, and must
hide and restrict their gains to levels beneath the true owner's marginal cost of protection.
Thus, the distinction between legal property and economic property relies not simply on
the obtuseness of the state in failing to recognize certain types of ownerships; rather, legal
property constitutes a distinct category with important value-creating aspects.
226
See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 183 (1968) ("[A] reduction in [the probability of apprehension] 'compensated' by an
equal percentage increase in [the level of punishment] would leave [the number of offenses] unchanged.., but would reduce the loss, because the costs of apprehension and
conviction would be lowered by the reduction in [the probability of apprehension].").
227
BARZEL, supra note 117, at 141.
228 Id. at 7-9, 85-104.
Infra Parts MA, D.
229
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nomic property." Rather, the law's recognition and protection of
property rights creates value for owners. The stability in ownership afforded by the law creates the possibility for developing new kinds of
value in, and uses of, property that would otherwise be unavailable.
Legal property, then, must be at the center of property analysis, rather
than simply an aside. To Barzel, property owners must share their
23 1
gains with all other claimants, from contract-holders to thieves.
This Article's value theory instead views the owner as the primary beneficiary of value, while others merely benefit from positive externalities. The owner is not merely the main beneficiary of legal protection,
but also the one who decides how much to develop the property and
how much to invest in self-help measures.2 3 2 Through these means,
the owner determines how much value to leave to others and the ease
with which they can capture it. Therefore, under the value theory,
Barzel has the relationship between property owners and other claimants backwards.
D.

Value and Information Theory

Next, the results of the value theory of property presented in this
Article are compared with those of an information-based conception.
As noted earlier, building on the assumption's centrality of in rem
rights in property, Merrill and Smith argue that property rights come
in a fixed number (numerus clausus) in order to promote easy and
cheap distribution of information about the rights pertaining to assets.23 3 Under Merrill and Smith's theory, property law aims at an op-

timal standardization of forms in order to reduce the cost of
investigating an asset's provenance and its attendant rights.

23 4

Con-

23 5

tracts, on the other hand, create only rights in personam.
Consequently, because contracts generally do not affect third parties, they
do not require standardization.
This Article posits that the value theory offers a different perspettive on the contract-property distinction. To see this, consider form
contracts. Dataholic Software Company sells its software application
in the following package: the software is encoded upon a CD-ROM,
which is sealed within an envelope, which in turn is enclosed in
Id. at 141.
Paradoxically, the owner may even occasionally want to reduce the value of property
to herself when doing so creates even greater proportional reduction in the property's
attractiveness to outside claimants. See Douglas W. Allen, The Rhino's Horn: Incomplete Property Rights and the Optimal Value of an Asset, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 339 (2002). For example,
students on college campuses that are prone to bicycle theft have been known to deface
their bicycles intentionally by scratching the paint or removing decals. The intention, of
course, is to make their bicycles appear less attractive to would-be thieves.
2-3
See supra Part I.E.
234
See Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 4, at 8.
235
See Merrill & Smith, Property/ContractInterface, supra note 4.
231
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shrink-wrap. On the outside of the envelope appears a standard form
contract, informing the purchaser Elaine that by opening the envelope, she is agreeing to the contractual licensing terms printed inside. 236 Obviously, there is neither an opportunity for Elaine to
bargain with Dataholic regarding these contract terms, nor is there an
opportunity for Elaine to inspect them before consummating her
purchase. With such a wide information gap between seller and
buyer, there exists a strong argument for legal policing of contract
terms or mandatory disclosure in order to produce optimal standardization of the contract. Although the need for information necessitates a rule of numerus clausus, this does not alter the fact that a form
contract is not property.2 37 Property law does not govern the form
contract, and, moreover, the form contract does not need in rem protection. This result is fully consistent with the value perspective
adopted by this Article.
The value perspective provides a useful way of distinguishing
property law from other legal fields, including contracts. In order to
determine which assets are appropriate subject matters of property
law, one can simply pose the question: would a taking of the physical
embodiment of the asset substantially deprive the holder of the value?
If the answer is yes, then the asset should receive in rem protection
and consequently be considered property. Two caveats are in order
here. First, not all legal entitlements that receive in rem protection
fall under the rubric of property. Second, the takings test does not
require a taking of the entire value. Stealing a company's pollution
permit or a taxi-cab driver's medallion 233 imposes the cost of getting a
replacement, but in neither case is the value of the underlying asset
substantially diminished, making these assets worthy of in personam
protection. Of course, the state may artificially create assets-such as
236

This description of the location of the contract terms closely approximates industry

practice. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (describing the use of"shrinkwrap licenses," and ultimately upholding their validity). For criticism,
see Julie Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management,"
97 Mici. L. REv. 462, 487 (1998) (criticizing the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in ProCD in
part because "the opportunity to engage in comparison shopping, so important to the
court in theory, does not seem particularly attractive if one must purchase each product to
learn the terms governing its use").

2'7

Significantly, the laws of many foreign countries provide for regulatory preapproval

of form contracts. See, e.g., Standard Contracts Law (lsr.) 1982, 37 L.S.I. 6 (1982-1983)
(allowing users of form contracts the opportunity to obtain government approval of certain types of "restrictive terms" and immunizing such approved terms from judicial invalidation for a limited time). See generally Larry Bates, AdministrativeRegulation of Terms in Form
Contracts: A ComparativeAnalysis of Consumer Protection, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1, 44-90
(2002) (discussing treatment of form contracts in the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden,
and Israel); Arthur Lenhoff, Contracts of Adhesion and the Freedom of Contract: A Comparative
Study in the Light of American and Foreign Law, 36 TUL. L. Rev. 481 (1962) (discussing the

various ways in which foreign countries approach form contracts).
238

See infra notes 269-73.
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bearer bonds or cash-that carry their value in their physical embodiment and consequently necessitate in rem protection.
Employing the nonconsensual taking test developed in this Article, one can see that standard form contracts do not need in rem protection. Stealing the preprinted form that specifies the contractual
terms does not substantially deprive the software owner of value. In
fact, because the software company prints the contract in the
thousands (or millions), even the evidentiary value of any given envelope is nil, while the replacement cost is restricted to the value of the
paper.
Merrill and Smith are not wrong in demonstrating the link between information and optimal standardization. Rather, this Article
seeks only to show that this link has little to do with the law of property, per se.
IV
REORDERING PROPERTY

As shown in Part I, confusion now reigns regarding all aspects of
property-its purpose, its nature, and its enforcement. In Parts II and
III, this Article sought to reintegrate property by proposing a unified
theory of property based on the idea that property is a legal mechanism designed to create and defend certain types of value. The aim
here is two-fold. First, the chief concerns of any theory of the law of
property are identified, thereby providing a centralized framework for
evaluating competing claims. Second, this Section illustrates that
careful attention to the importance of value-in particular, the value
that inheres in stable ownership-to the theory and law of property
can answer all four of the central property questions posed by the
framework of this Article.
The exposition here begins by explicating the four foundational
questions of property theory. To understand what distinguishes property from other legal fields, it is first necessary to enumerate its essential characteristics. In contrast to current scholarship's seeming aim
of fragmenting the field,23 9 this Article's goal is to create a unifying
logical structure. This Article posits that the field of property, of necessity, addresses four interlocking questions. Specifically, the law of
property must address these elements: (1) what things property law
protects; 240 (2) vis-AI-vis whom; (3) with what rights; and (4) by what
See, e.g., STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 31-36 (1990) (criticizing the
239
"claim that.., the notion of property is too fragmented to allow for a general theory").
240
We should make several semantic notes here. First, in using the term "thing," this
Article does not seek to restrict property to physical items. Rather, any item which can be
the locus of the types of value with which property is concerned can be labeled a "thing,"
including intangible items such as ideas. Second, in referring to a person, this Article is
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enforcement mechanism. These questions are discussed in order,
with two central aims-to demonstrate that this Article's framework
provides an indispensable prism for evaluating extant scholarship's fit
with a holistic understanding of property, and to show that value illuminates each of the four elements in the holistic perspective constructed by this Article.
Before turning to the discussion of the four questions, it is paramount to emphasize that it is the combined discussion of all four
questions that shapes the realm of property. The particular discussion
of each question adds an element to the property edifice this Article
seeks to construct. As befits a holistic approach, each question is but a
step towards the ultimate goal of redefining property as a field-no
single question can accomplish this task.
A.

Which Assets

As noted in Part II, the traditional conception of property as
thing-ownership faded in the last century and has been replaced with
the new conception of property as an "abstract bundle of legal relations. '2 41 Indeed, time has proved that a "thing" oriented conception
of property poses real difficulties in a world where the law of property
is often applied to legal abstractions such as patents and copyrights.
In the information age, where the most valuable property rights are
often found in intangible goods, "thingness" is ever more remote
242
from the law of property.
Yet, as many scholars have noted, 243 the idea of property as
"things" has continued to maintain its hold on the popular imagination. 244 The importance of this phenomenon extends beyond the senot referring only to a "natural person;" corporations and other types of organi7ations may
be considered persons. Finally, to avoid excessively cumbersome formulations, the Article
generally refers to both person and thing in the singular, even in cases where the property
relationship could also apply to multiple persons or things. On this last point, however,
the reader should bear in mind that in many ways the ideal property relationship is between a single owner and a thing. This is because where property is fragmented among
many owners, interproperty conflicts may arise.
241 See Michael A. Heller, Three Faces of Private Property, 79 OR. L. REv. 417, 429-31
(2000) (surveying the transformation of property from "thing-ownership" to a "bundle of
rights").
242
For a recent call to revive this conception in patent law, see John R. Thomas, The
Post-IndustrialPatentSystem, 10 FoROHAm INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 3, 10 (1999) (stating that patent law is concerned with "the physical instantiation of technological knowledge rather than that knowledge itself"); see alsoJohn R. Thomas, The Patentingof the Liberal
Professions,40 B.C. L. Rev. 1139, 1147 (1999) (discussingjudicial and Patent Office reliance
on this conception of physical instantiation in patent law).
243 See supra note 20.
244 See, e.g.,
MUNZER, supra note 239, at 23, 74 (finding "the popular conception, which
views property as things, is not, as some philosophers and lawyers might think, wholly misguided," due to the "essential materiality of property"); cf Grey, supra note 5, at 76-79
(suggesting that although lay people naively cling to a unitary, objective, physicalist ideal,
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mantic confusion created by the popular usage of "property" as a term
for things and the technical usage of the term "property" to denote
legal rights related to those things. The popular view, in fact, reflects
the accurate perception that the law of property has an important relationship to things. Thus, laypersons see property as a right in rema characterization addressed in the next Section-and recognize that
property rights do not exist in the absence of a "thing" to which they
2 45
can attach.
It is crucial to clarify that in the context of property, the term
"thing" extends beyond physical objects. Property's usage of the concept of "thing" is capacious, including not just tangible items but also
247
ideas and qualities. 2 4 6 Accordingly, intangible goods such as ideas,
24 9
248
may be proper subjects of property law.
or symbols
expressions,
Moreover, as demonstrated later, while the restriction of property to
things is not meaningless, in practice there do not appear to be real
assets in the world to which property categorically cannot apply because of the absence of a "thing." Employing the value theory of this
Article demonstrates this.
To remind the reader, the value theory of property presented
here maintains that the institution of property creates and protects
the value inherent in the stable ownership of assets. This definition
implies the first limitation on property law: where stable ownership of
assets provides no greater value, protection of rights in the asset lies
beyond property law, and no one should be able to claim property
rights in such assets. In theory, this means that no property rights
should be recognized for abundant assets-i.e., where the assets may
be obtained cosflessly and all conceivable demand for them is met. In
practice, however, infinitely available and costlessly obtained goods
are not found.
Consider the example of air. At one time, we might have thought
of air as the infinitely available, costlessly obtained asset. One might
they will eventually accept the specialist view of the disintegrating nature of property, and
property will lose its traditional inspirational role).
See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consis245
tency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1380 (1989) (describing the
need for a physical embodiment in copyright with "'works of authorship' ... 'fixed' in 'a
tangible medium of expression'").
246
See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1864 (4th ed.
2002) (listing among the definitions of "thing": "1. An entity, an idea, or a quality per2.b. An entity existing in space
ceived, known, or thought to have its own existence ....
and time . . . . 3. Something referred to by a word, a symbol, a sign, or an idea; a
referent. ..

").

See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2004); P. Kanagavel, Intellectual PropertyRights: A Comprehensive
Overview, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 663 (2003). Intellectual property rights, of
course, are not available for all ideas, expressions and symbols.
248
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2002); Kanagavel, supra note 247.
249
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1999).
247
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think of air as an inexhaustible resource; Frances may breathe all she
wants, without ever reducing the air supply available to Gloria or to
future generations. It would seem pointless to the point of absurdity,
therefore, to allow for the possibility of property rights in air. As it
turns out, however, air is neither infinitely available nor always
costlessly obtained. If Heavyhanded Enterprises should decide to
open several large coal-fired plants, Ivy who lives nearby may find her
air is no longer so freely available. Similar observations might be
made about other apparently abundant resources, including water.
Generally, it seems unlikely that any inexhaustible and costlessly obtainable resource exists.
Economically minded readers may notice the similarity with the
concept of public goods. The term public good denotes goods whose
consumption is nonrivalrous and whose benefits are non-excludable. 250 Nonrivalrous consumption means that consumption of the
good by one person does not rival consumption by another.2 5 1 In
practice, this means that the good is inexhaustible, like the example
of air. Nonexcludability refers to the inability of the good's owner to
exclude consumers.2 5 2 The result of these two features of public
goods creates the need for government provision; that is, other than
altruists, private persons would provide only those goods from which
they could enjoy sufficient benefits to warrant the provision. 25 - In saying that inexhaustible goods are not a good subject of property law,
we are implying that pure public goods would not properly be considered property. Pure public goods, however, do not exist in the real
world. As Buchanan observed, "the elements of demand for any
good, whether this be classified as wholly, partially, or not at all 'public' by the standard criteria, may be factored down into private and
collective aspects."2 54 Air, for example, has aspects of both a private
good and a public good. As such, it cannot categorically be excluded
from the realm of assets to which the law of property applies.
To be sure, not all assets fall within the realm of the law of property. But, this is not because of their intrinsic unsuitability as im250
See supra Part I.C. Not all agree on the precise definition of public good. Harold
Demsetz has argued that a good is a public good solely on the grounds of nonrivalrous
consumption. To Demsetz, a public good which satisfies the additional condition of nonexcludability is a "collective good." Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods,
13J.L. & ECON. 293, 295 (1970); see also RIcHARD CORNES & ToDD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF

EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 6-7 (1986).
251
Id. ("If... an agent's consumption of a unit of a good fully eliminates any benefits
that others can obtain from that unit, rivalry ... is person.").
252
Id. ("Benefits that are available to all once the good is provided are termed

nonexcludable.").
253 Id.
254

JAMES M. BUCHANAN,

4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M.

BUCHANAN:

FINANCE IN DEMOCRATIC PROCESS: FISCAL INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL CHOICE

PUBLIC

21 (1999).

A THEORY OF PROPERTY

2005]

proper "things" to be viewed as property. Rather, as we shall see in
the following section, it is due to their inability to be properly protected by a regime of in rem rights.
B.

Vis-A-vis Whom

When Blackstone described property as the law of things, 255 he
was reflecting the historical understanding of property as creating
rights in rem, i.e., against the rest of the world. In time, however, the
in rem characterization was eclipsed by Hohfeld's argument that any
2
in rem right is essentially a multiplicity of in personam rights.

56

In

time, Hohfeld's analytical move was viewed as stripping the in rem
25 7
Thus, the domcharacterization of any importance in property law.

inant description of property law became a collection of rights varying
with the "sticks" included in the bundle and with the persons against
2 58
whom such "sticks" are effective.
Recently, Merrill and Smith have sought to revive the primacy of
the in rem aspect of property law. 259 As the reader may recall, Merrill
and Smith's theory posits that property is a right in rem and expounds
the informational implications of this characterization. 260 It is critical
to note, however, that Merrill and Smith do not explain why property
creates rights in rem; they simply assume that it does. While Merrill
and Smith's attempt to highlight the informational component of
property law is commendable-and this Article joins in their effort to
restrict the law of property to in rem rights-this Article's aim is
broader. It is to step back and provide an explanation for why property rights must be in rem. This Article shows that in rem rights are
important to property not simply for taxonomic reasons a la
Hohfeld, 26 1 nor for reasons of notice a la Merrill and Smith; 262 rather,
it demonstrates that in rem rights are crucially important to defend
the value lying at the heart of property protection. Thus, the value
theory of property indicates why protection of in rem rights is singularly the most important item in defining a legal right as based in the
law of property. One important result is that a value-based explanation provides a better screen for distinguishing between property and
nonproperty rights than an explanation based in information
provision.
255

256
257
258
259
260
261

262
I.E.

supra note 68, at Chap. 1.
Hohfeld II, supra note 76, at 718-33.
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
BLACKSTONE,

See
See
See
See
See

id.
supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
supra Part I.E.
supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
Merrill & Smith, Property/ContractInterface, supra note 4, at 790-91; supra Part
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To understand how the value theory underscores the importance
of in rem rights in property law, it is necessary, once again, to reiterate
the locus of value that is both created and protected by property law
under the value theory: stability of ownership. Under the value theory, in rem rights have a primarily creative force; in rem protection
establishes the possibility of maintaining value in stability and often by
sentiment. To illustrate, let us return to the example of air employed
in the previous section. Imagine that Joyous Enterprises decides to
market a new product called Summit Air. The company sends representatives to the Himalayan peaks to scoop air into hermetically sealed
cans. 26 3 The sealed cans are then sold in Joyous Outlet Stores, where
consumers are advised to open the cans close to their faces to enjoy a
brief whiff of mountain air. Here, as with Heavyhanded Enterprises in
the previous section, Joyous Enterprises has captured the value of
air-an asset of value that may properly be the subject of property law.
The question now, is whether Joyous should have in rem rights in its
cans of air or whether in personam rights will suffice. The obvious
answer is that in rem rights are necessary to defend the value of the
cans of air. If Joyous lacked in rem rights, significantly fewer cans
264
would appear on the market, if any appeared at all.
In a world without in rem rights, Joyous (and everyone else)
would have to contract with every potential transferee, whether consensual or nonconsensual, to create a legal in personam means of
transferring possession. The result would be one in which only a few
persons could enjoy stable possession rights. Joyous, for example,
might contract with all of its employees not to take the cans. It might
even place a security guard outside its Outlet Stores and require all
entering consumers to agree to pay for any merchandise removed
from the premises. Consumers, however, could not possibly enter
into contracts with every possible taker upon leaving the store. As a
result, the only consumers forJoyous' Summit Air would be those consumers who wished to breathe the air within the store or those for
whom it was cost-effective to protect the cans outside of the store without any benefit from the law.
Thus, in rem rights constitute a mechanism for protecting value
encapsulated in stable ownership of assets and provide a measure of
legal protection for asset value that any holder may enjoy. The result
263 While the example may sound somewhat exotic, the reader is invited to consider
the example of Christian pilgrims who bottle water from theJordan River in order to enjoy
baptismal waters from the "Holy Land." The water is entirely unremarkable-except, perhaps, for its lack of cleanliness-but for its provenance.
264
Without in rem rights, potential possessors of the cans would have a lower
probability of retaining the cans and an increased cost of defending them from potential
takers, thereby lowering the overall value of the utility function and persuading potential
customers that purchasing cans of air would not be worthwhile. See supra Part II.B.
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is that in rem protection is indispensable for realizing the full potential value of the asset.
We may contrast this with an example of an in personam right in
the same asset. Consider air rights once more. This time, however,
the focus is on the tradable pollution mechanism employed in environmental protection statutes. These provisions depart from the
usual regulatory limitations on pollution emissions, seeking instead to
establish a market in pollution rights by allowing polluters to purchase
regulatory rights from other polluters. Imagine that both Katastrophic Kilns and Lovely Lava are manufacturers whose emissions of
sulfur dioxide are regulated by the Clean Air Act. 265 The Act establishes a maximum tonnage of sulfur dioxide emissions from all factories in the contiguous States and the District of Columbia.2 66
Individual emitting factories must possess the necessary permits to
cover their expected emissions, which they may purchase from a government auction or from other permit owners. 26 7 Lovely Lava examines the market for emission permits and determines that it is more
efficient to install new scrubbers to reduce emissions. Katastrophic
Kilns, on the other hand, calculates that purchasing permits is the
cheaper route. Katastrophic Kilns therefore buys Lovely Lava's
permits.
Should the permits be protected by property law? The in rem
nature of property law dictates a negative answer, and the value theory
explains why. The permits themselves do not embody an in rem right.
The relevant right to pollute is granted by the regulatory authority
and it is enforceable only against that authority. Thus, if the CEO of
Miserly Manufacturers were to break into the headquarters of Katastrophic Kilns and steal the permits, she would not have acquired any
right to pollute nor would Katastrophic Kilns have lost any. The rights
embodied in the permits, in other words, are in personam rights that
move not with the object, but through authorized channels approved
by the regulatory agency. The value theory explains why this is the
right result: the permit documentation is merely paper evidence of
the right, rather than the right itself. Theft of the documentation is
therefore theft only of paper, which conveys no rights. 268 With no
value of stability in ownership at stake, there is no reason to employ
the law of property. Indeed, even if Katastrophic Kilns received no
rights to possess the paper, it would still not lose any of its administrative rights.
42 U.S.C. § 7651 (2002).
See id.
267
See Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN. ENVrL. L.J. 300
(1995) (summarizing and criticizing Clean Air Act's emission trading program).
268 The sheet of paper, on the other hand, is an asset whose value is lost in unstable
ownership, and is, therefore, an asset defended by the law of property.
265
266
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We may advance the value understanding of the importance of in
rem rights by considering a set of additional examples. First, consider
a case in which the paper permit stolen by Miserly Manufacturers actually conveyed the right to emit sulfur dioxide, rather than merely
serving as evidence of the right. Indeed, many types of papers have
the power to dispose of the value they represent. Bearer bonds and
many negotiable instruments, for example, pay a sum of money to the
bearer of the instrument-the paper itself contains the right to re2 69
ceive the money, rather than merely serving as evidence of a debt.
Bearer bonds, therefore, are best treated as property themselves,
rather than as evidence of an in personam claim; bearer bonds' transferability and value depends on a bearer being able to rely on legally
protected stability in ownership. Similarly, if the regulatory authority
invested in emissions permits the power to emit sulfur dioxide, rather
than merely making them evidence of the power to emit, the permits
would best be seen as property themselves. One could conceive of a
legal regime under which any person who presents a pollution permit
would be entitled, without more, to the emission units specified in the
permit. In this scenario, the classification of pollution rights would
change from rights in personam to rights in rem.
The broader insight provided by these examples is that the regulatory authority has the ability, by defining the administrative right, to
create either in rem property rights or in personam rights. This offers
an important refinement to Charles Reich's classic The Newo Property.270
Reich observed that in modern times, a great deal of wealth is created
and distributed by the government through administrative
processes. 27' He labeled such assets "new property." 272 The analysis
in this Article, however, demonstrates that Reich's classification is only
partly accurate. While Reich was correct in noting that regulatory authorities may create new property, one should not group all wealth269

See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 507 (1988) (

Historically, bonds have been issued as either registered bonds or bearer
bonds. These two types of bonds differ in the mechanisms used for transferring ownership and making payments. Ownership of a registered bond is
recorded on a central list, and a transfer of record ownership requires entering the change on that list. The record owner automatically receives
interest payments. . . . Ownership of a bearer bond, in contrast, is presumed from possession and is transferred by physically handing over the
bond. The bondowner obtains interest payments by presenting bond coupons to a bank.
270
Reich, supra note 2 (classifying government largess as the new property and advocating for protection for the rights associated with it).
Id. at 734-37.
271
272
Id. (including all forms of government largesse, from welfare benefits to federal
Social Security and taxicab medallions).
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enhancing or transferring administrative rights under the heading of
2 73
property.
In rem protection may also extend to intangible items such as
ideas and expression. In such cases, does this Article's test hold? The
Article posits that intangible property may be examined by means of
the "taking test," at least in theory. Imagine, for instance, that in the
future a mind-reading device is created. In this futuristic world, any
person in possession of the device can steal another's ideas at will.
Assume, now, that Naive Nancy comes up with a brilliant tune for her
next blockbuster album. Excited, she calls her best friend, Overbearing Otto, and breaks the news to him. Before the call reaches its conclusion, Otto takes out his personal mind reader, presses the
appropriate buttons and downloads the song directly into his dull
mind. Otto then records the song and performs it for pay, diluting
the market for Naive Nancy. Otto has thus succeeded, by means of a
taking, in reducing the value of the song for Nancy while greatly increasing its value to him. While this example seems like a strange
cross between Johnny Mnemonic and Men In Black, it teaches a valuable
lesson. There are items in the world, such as the emissions permit in
the previous example, whose appropriation-even in the most outlandish futuristic scenario-would not convey value. Thus, a sharp
divide exists between assets for which in rem protection may add value
and those for which it would not.
Of course, the law of property conforms to the world as it is,
rather than the world as it might be. Thus, while the music in Naive
Nancy's head is, in theory, an appropriate subject for in rem protection, there is no need to extend such protection in a world without
273

Adding yet more confusion to the picture, courts have, for many years, interpreted

"property" extraordinarily broadly for purposes of the Due Process Clauses, U.S. CONST.
amends. V, XIV. As the Supreme Court made clear in Board of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972), "property interests protected by procedural due process extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money." For purposes
of the Due Process Clauses, "property" has been stretched to include such non-property
interests as the right to police protection arising from a court order, Gonzalez v. City of
Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Town of Castle Rock
v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 417 (2004), continued public employment, Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972), free education, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975),
driver's licenses, Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971), and professional licenses, Barry
v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979). A full survey of the scope and meaning of "property" in
the context of the Due Process Clauses is beyond the scope of this Article. It should be
clear, however, that the case law does not employ "property" in the ordinary sense of the
concept. Rather, "property" in this context encompasses legally protected entitlements of
any kind, and thereby "endorse[s] a method of pure positivism in identifying constituThomas Merrill,
The Landscape of Constitutional Property,
tional property."
86 VA. L. REV. 885, 922 (2000); see also Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative
State, 72 CAL. L. Rav. 1044, 1087 (1984) (arguing that in many Due Process cases, "the
property designation was meaningless" and "[I] iberty and property are simply not useful
concepts in this context").
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mind-reading machines. Indeed, the law declines to extend property
protection to copyright, absent a physical embodiment of the expression.2 74 Admittedly, the physical embodiment of an expression does
not partake of precisely the same qualities as an ordinary physical asset. If Peter, for example, were to steal Quincy's laptop, the entire
value of the asset would transfer from Quincy to Peter.27 5 The case of
a copyright is rather different. If Ralph wanted to steal the copyright
of Stephanie's book, he would find that doing so is impossible. True,
Ralph could deprive Stephanie of some of the value of the copyright
by printing counterfeit copies and putting them on the market. But
that action would only dilute some of the value Stephanie would derive from her copyright. Note that Stephanie too cannot concentrate
the entire value of the copyright in a single object and protect it adequately. In general, while an asset with no tangible expression whatsoever is a poor candidate for property protection, an asset might be a
worthy aspirant for property rights even in the absence of complete
physical expression of the asset's value. The determining factor is
whether the physical expression contains a substantial portion of the
value-as if Overbearing Otto were to steal Naive Nancy's first recording of her tune-or is merely an empty symbol of the asset-as with
Katastrophic Kilns's emission permit stolen by Miserly Manufacturers.
Most importantly, this test offers a convincing rationale for why
contracts should be considered as creating rights in personam. Assume that Toni and Ursula enter into a contract for computer services. Victor, Toni's envious competitor (and law school dropout),
decides to break into Toni's office and steal a copy of the contract in
the hope of harming Toni. Unfortunately for Victor, his fiendish plan
is foiled by his analytical confusion. Clearly, stealing Toni's copy of
the contract is not going to deprive her of any substantial value-in
fact, it will probably deprive her of no value whatsoever. Not only is
the physical contract in this case merely evidentiary, but also Toni
could insure herself against Victor's (and others') folly by making several copies of the contract and storing them in different places. Because nonconsensual takers of contract copies cannot eviscerate the
value inherent in the deal for the contracting parties, contracts do not
necessitate in rem protection.

274
See Gordon, supra note 245. Similarly, in the real world, patent protection will not
obtain in the absence of some tangible evidence of the idea. See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60-63 (1998) (discussing Alexander Graham Bell's grant of a
patent on the ground that his idea was complete and supported by a description and
drawings).
275 This assumes, of course, that Peter need not fear that Quincy will recover the stolen
computer.
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Which Rights

The "bundle of sticks" conception views property law as creating
an almost random variety of rights and duties that the law recognizes
in the standard owner.2 7 6 While Honor6's list of ownership "incidents" 27 7 has been extremely influential,2 78 there is little agreement
among scholars as to the relative importance of each stick in the bun2 79
or even as to the usual bundle's contents. 2 0 The confusion has
dle
arisen in particular in several specific contexts. For instance, in the
field of regulatory takings, many scholars have despaired of the possibility of determining how many property rights must be "taken" by
276
Cf Jeanne L. Shroeder, NeverJam To-day: On the Impossibility of TakingsJurisprudence,
84 Gpo. L.J. 1531, 1554 (1996) (arguing that despite the metaphor's own implication,
"property is not a random or arbitrary collection of disparate rights").
See Honorh, supra note 17, at 113.
277
278 See, e.g., Penner, supra note 85, at 713 (noting that Honord's incidents and "[t]he
bundle of rights analysis of property... serve[s] as a 'dominant paradigm' under the aegis
of which working lawyers and academic theorists may attend to particular problems in the
law of property"); Note, Distributive Liberty: A Relational Model of Freedom, Coercion, and Property Law, 107 HARv. L. REv. 859, 861 n.5 (1994) (noting, with respect to Honore's eleven
incidents of property, that "[d]espite its oversimplicity, this conception still operates as a
background understanding of property.").
279 Compare Teena-Ann V. Sankoorikal, Using Scientific Advances to Conceive the "Perfect"
Donor: The Pandora'sBox of Creating Child Donorsfor the Purpose of Saving Ailing Family Members, 32 SETON HALL L. Rev. 583, 589 (2002) ("Under the 'bundle of rights' framework, the
hallmarks of a property right include the ability to control something and the ability to
prevent others from interfering with that control."), with Sarah Harding, Justifying Repatriation of Native American CulturalProperty, 72 IND. L.J. 723, 759 (1997) (writing, "the familiar
notion of a bundle which includes an abundance of rights, most prominently, the rights to
possess, use, capitalize on, and exclude others . . . ."), and Arun S. Subramanian, Note,
Assessing the Rights of IRU Holders in Uncertain Times, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 2094, 2098 (2003)
(suggesting that in analyzing indefeasible rights of use-a transactional form common in
the telecommunications industry-under a bundle of rights framework "there are four
important factors to consider: (1) use, (2) physical occupation, (3) control, and (4) economic possession").
280 See, e.g., Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Reconstitutionof Property:Property as a Web
of Interests, 26 HARv. ENVrL. L. REv. 281, 285 n.20 (2002) (citing and describing six different scholarly lists of the incidents of property); Dagan, supra note 4, at 1532 ("There is
[not] an a priori list of entitlements that the owner of a given resource inevitably enjoys...."). CompareJEssE DUKEMINIER &JAMES E, KRJER, PROPERTY 86 (3d ed. 1993) (listing
the rights to possess, use, exclude, and transfer), with Richard A. Epstein, Pr-operty and Necessity, 13 -IARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 2, 3 (1990) (listing the rights to possess, use, and dispose
of), and Honore, supra note 17, at 113-28 (listing the rights to possess, use, manage, receive income and capital, and maintain security and residuary character; the incidents of
transmissibility and absence of term; the prohibition of harmful use; and the liability to
execution). In fact, modern statutory andjudicial conceptions of certain "property" classes
explicitly limit the incidents granted to those classes. For example, although the right to
use and enjoyment is typically regarded as a core incident of property, no such right exists
in a patent grant. See, e.g., Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 548 (1852) ("The franchise
which the patent grants, consists altogether in the right to exclude every one from making,
using, or vending the thing patented, without the permission of the patentee. This is all
that he obtains by the patent."); see alsoJacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and
Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REv. 135, 171-73 (2004) (discussing the discrepancies between
the traditional incidents of property and the incidents granted in intellectual property).
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government regulation 281 before "property" is considered taken and
compensation demanded by the Constitution.2 82 Scholars have frequently noted, for instance, that policing the boundaries of regulatory
takings is particularly difficult in the era of the "bundle of rights"
property conception. 283 This Section shows the importance of the
value theory both in shaping the list of rights attending property ownership and in determining which of the rights are indispensable.
Later, Part VI considers some of the implications of the value approach to such conundrums as the proper scope of regulatory takings.
281
Compare, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277, 281 (1928) (finding no taking
where a state regulation required owners to cut down red cedar trees infected with a virus
that could kill apple trees), with Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Mid-Fla. Growers,
Inc., 521 So. 2d 101, 102 (Fla. 1998) (holding full and just compensation required when
state, pursuant to its police power, destroyed healthy trees). Compare also Pa. Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922) (finding that the elimination of mining rights constitutes a taking), with Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 506
(1987) (holding the elimination of mining rights is not a taking). See, e.g., ACKERmAN,
supra note 7, at 3 (writing that takings jurisprudence is "set of confused judicial responses"); Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity of Advantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward a New
Theory of Takings Jurisprudence, 40 Ams. U. L. REv. 297, 299-300 (1990) (Takings jurisprudence is a "chameleon of ad hoc decisions that has bred considerable confusion . .. ");
Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause:In Search of UnderlyingPrinciples PartI-A Critique of
Current Takings ClauseDoctrine, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1301, 1304 (1989) ("[I]t is difficult to imagine a body of case law in greater doctrinal and conceptual disarray."); Carol M. Rose,
Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. Rev. 561, 562
(1984) (exploring "possible reasons for the elusiveness of the meaning of 'taking' in our
law"). Indeed, there is a small cottage industry in stringing together quotes proclaiming
the hopelessness of attempting to understand takings jurisprudence. See, e.g., Michael A.
Culpepper, Comment, The Strategic Alternative: How State Takings Statutes May Resolve the
Unanswered Questions of Palazzolo, 36 U. RicH. L. REv. 509, 509 (2002) ("[C]ritics describe
the world of federal takings jurisprudence as 'an unworkable muddle,' as 'ajumble of
confusing holdings,' and as a body of law existing in 'doctrinal and conceptual disarray."'
(citations omitted)); Zach Whitney, Comment, Regulatory Takings: DistinguishingBetween the
Pivilege of Use and Duty, 86 MARQ. L. REv. 617, 618 (2002) ("Commentators have eloquently
described the law of takings as 'engulfed in confusion,' 'suffer[ing] from its own inconsistency,' 'a problem of considerable difficulty,' and 'a secret code that only a momentary
majority of the Court is able to understand.'" (citations omitted)); cf Marc R. Poirier, The
Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CaRDozo L. REV. 93 (2002) (
Everyone has heard the grumbling about the vagueness or messiness of the
doctrine of regulatory takings. In judicial opinion and academic assessment alike, it seems almost de rigaeur to include at least one or two choice
sentences of complaint, before going about whatever business the opinion
or article seeks to accomplish.

282 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."); seealso William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REv. 553, 555 (1972) (discussing state "just compensation" provisions).
283 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Four Questions for Legal Theory, in PROPERTY: NOMOS
XXII, supranote 5, at 351, 365 ("Without [the bundle-of-rights] theory, the Scientific Policysnaker would have no choice but to interpret the Takings Clause as... protecting all uses
once they have been legally authorized. But the [constitutional] text does not impose such
an absurd command."); Michael A. Heller &James E. Krier, Deterrence andDistributionin the
Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REv. 997, 1015 (1999) (discussing how "'private property'
cannot meaningfully be defined absent context").
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The bundle of rights conception has spawned various formulations of property incidents. The most minimal formulation, and possibly most widely accepted, enumerates the fights to use, exclude, and
transfer as the constitutive elements of property. 28 4 The most expansive one, compiled by HonorS, 285 lists eleven incidents as the contents
of property, yet omits the right to exclude, which is considered by
many as "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that
are commonly characterized as property" 28 6 or even its "sine qua
non."28 7 The view of property as a bundle of rights has wrought more
perplexity than clarity, leading J.E. Penner to conclude that
"[p]roperty is a bundle of rights' is little more than a slogan."28 8
The challenge facing a property theorist is to explain why any
particular list is essential to property, and why it should be preferred
over its competitors. The answer to this challenge lies in the common
theme underlying the law of property-the protection of value. Begin
with the right to exclude; exclusion is essential to property owners
because it protects stable possession by repelling nonconsensual takers and users of the asset. Recalling the earlier discussion of the importance of in rem rights to property, intrinsic to the nature of
property is that it must defend against takings that will substantially
reduce or eliminate the value owners derive from the asset. From a
systemic viewpoint, the right to exclude does exactly that through the
wholesale engendering of the necessary element of stability of
ownership.
An important aspect of the value enabled by the right to exclude
is sentimental or other idiosyncratic value not reflected in the market
price. 289 Often, owners develop sentimental relationships with assets
protected by property rights, such that their "reserve price" (the price
at which they would be willing to sell the object) is substantially in
excess of the market price. 290 These gaps between reserve and market
prices should be widely observed, and the value reflected by the
higher reserve price can often be protected only by an in rem right
that includes the right to exclude nonconsensual users.
This Article's value-based perspective provides an even more basic explanation of such property incidents as use and transfer. Use
represents direct extraction of value for the owner, and transfer embodies the potential to extract value from the asset by conveying it to
284

See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supranote 280, at 86 (listing the incidents of property

as the rights to possess, use, exclude, and transfer).
285 See HonorS, supra note 17, at 113.

286

Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).

287

Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REv. 730, 730 (1998).

288
289

See Penner, supra note 85, at 714.
See Radin, supra note 20, at 959-60.

290

See supra Part III.B.
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others who might value it more highly, either for consideration or as a
gift. Furthermore, owners may derive value from discretionary nonuse of assets. For instance, Weepy Willa may keep in storage her
grandmother's first grade book and derive sentimental value from
mere possession of the object and knowledge that it continues to exist. Honor6's listed incidents of the right to property's income and
capital 291 should be seen as corollaries of the right to use, as interpreted by the value theory.
At the end of the day, the value-based theory offers an auspicious
opportunity for the law of property to regain its coherence by doing
away with the enterprise of endlessly compiling competing lists of incidents, and adopting in their stead a single focus on value. Essentially,
the value theory of property posits that all property incidents are mere
manifestations of a central right to enjoy and protect value. This paradigm shift has a number of important implications for property law,
which are discussed later in Part V.
D.

What Enforcement

Enforcement issues were not part of the classic property discourse. As explained in Part VII, this oversight is unfortunate because
enforcement issues are in large part responsible for the current disarray in property theory. Eventually, however, enforcement issues did
find their way into the discussion thanks to Calabresi and Melamed's
division of the legal protection of entitlements into property, liability,
and inalienability rules.29 2 Of particular importance was their choice
of the term "property rule" to denote what is essentially injunctive relief.293 As Merrill and Smith noted, this use does not correspond to
the general scholarly understanding of property. 294 While on the surface, injunctive remedies might seem a natural expression of the right
to exclude, the differences between the concepts are evident upon
closer examination. The right to exclude refers to a right of property
owners in the abstract; the "property rule" refers to the remedy that
the courts will afford to the right claimant. Thus, for example, the
fact that Xena owns a plot of land and possesses the right to exclude
others is not dispositive of the question of how she may respond to the
entry of Yvette. Generally, state laws will only allow Xena a limited
right to forcibly eject Yvette; thereafter, Xena's right to exclude may
be remedied only by turning to law enforcement authorities for relief.
One might easily imagine the recognition of a right to exclude where
its violation triggered a claim for monetary compensation (liability
291
292

293
294

See supra text accompanying note 90.
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 111, at 1092.
Id.
Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property, supra note 7.
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295
rule protection, under Calabresi and Melamed's terminology)
rather than injunctive relief.
Nevertheless, the value theory shows that the Calabresi-Melamedian decision to refer to injunctive relief as "property rule" protection captures a correct intuition. As law and economics scholars
have noted, property rule protection enables the entitlement holder
to set the price at which the item will be used or transferred. 29 6 A
fortiori, it also empowers the holder to refuse to deal altogether and
keep the object. Property rule enforcement is therefore instrumental
in the blocking of nonconsensual takings that may substantially deplete the value assets generate for their owners. Hence, the value theory shows that, in general, property rules are the proper enforcement
mechanism for property rights.
It bears emphasis that despite the general affinity between property rights and injunctive relief, in some cases it would be justifiable to
deviate from the norm and employ monetary damages, or "liability
rules" in the Calabresi-Melamedian parlance. 297 While injunctive
remedies are necessary to protect the value derived by the owner from
the assets, where the owner loses no value by having the asset taken
and replaced by compensation, there is no longer any reason to demand injunctive relief. Consider, for example, Zelda's property interest in cash. If a twenty-dollar bill were taken from Zelda's purse,
under most circumstances Zelda would lose no value if she were compensated with a different twenty dollar bill.
This example, however, also demonstrates the limitations of the
principle. If the stolen twenty-dollar bill were the precise one received by Zelda for the sale of her first short story, she might have
enjoyed sentimental value in ownership of the bill, such that a different twenty-dollar bill would no longer constitute adequate compensaLion. Even in cases in which the asset is devoid of sentimental value,
there may be value in protecting the stability of ownership by means
of injunctive relief. Obtaining compensatory relief and purchasing a
replacement item are not costless actions, and judicially determined
damages may often employ methods that undercompensate for property. 298 If, for instance, Zelda needs cash, but she receives compensation in the form of a check, the cashing of which involves a fee or
standing in line at a bank, then a twenty-dollar damage award will not
be an adequate replacement for the twenty-dollar bill. Thus, when
awarding compensatory damages for the loss of property, courts must

See id.
See id.
297
See id.
298
There may also be cases where the reserve price is lower than the market price, but
transaction costs bar the consensual transfer of the property.
295

296
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consider replacement costs and award aggrieved owners incidental
and consequential damages.
The costs to ownership stability engendered by the refusal to extend injunctive relief do not constitute the only effect of liability rule
(i.e., compensatory damage-based) protection. Liability rules may reduce transaction costs where private bargaining is expensive relative
to litigation. 299 Liability rules may also be helpful in overcoming strategic obstacles to successful negotiations. 300 Thus, there may be cases
where liability rule protection (or pliability rule, i.e., variable rule protection 30 1) may be the appropriate policy response to threats against
property rights. In making the determination to turn away from injunctive relief (property rule protection), however, policymakers must
take into account the likely disutility engendered by diminished ownership stability.
V
UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY WITH THE VALUE THEORY

This Part moves from the theoretical to the applied and demonstrates the explanatory power of the value theory in property law. The
Part proceeds by showing the value theory's power to explain several
broad themes and specific doctrines in the law of property.
299
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 111, at 1105-10; see also Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REv.
713, 719, 726-27 (1996) (arguing that liability rules should be favored over property rules
when transaction costs are high because the former minimize information costs).
'100
On strategic obstacles to successful bargaining, see Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase,
11J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 23 (1982) (showing that disagreement as to how to divide the contrac-

tual surplus is a strategic barrier to successful Coasean negotiation); see alsoJohn Kennan &
Robert Wilson, Bargainingwith Private Information, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 46 (1993)
(theorizing that differences in private information are a primary cause of delays in bargaining). On asymmetric information, strategic bargaining, and liability riles, see Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Comment, Do Liability Rules FacilitateBargaining? A Reply to Ayres
and Talley, 105 YALE L.J. 221, 223-29 (1995) (
When each party's own valuation is not known by the other, each party will
have incentives to misrepresent its valuation in bargaining, hoping to extract more of the bargaining surplus from the other party. Parties may
therefore demand too much or offer too little, with the result that efficient
bargains may not be reached. In this case, one cannot say unambiguously
whether property rules or liability rules will be superior.
); Robert P. Merges, Of Proprty Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REv.
2655, 2659 (1994) (observing that in the field of intellectual property the valuation problem heightens the possibility of strategic behavior); see also Karen Eggleston et al., The
Design and Interpretationof Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 91, 109 (2000)
(defining "asymmetric information" as a situation in which "[o]ne party to a contract...
has more information about future states of the world than does the other party").
901 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MicH. L. REv. 1, 5
(2002) ("Pliability or pliable rules are contingent rules that provide an entitlement owner
with property rule or liability rule protection as long as some specified condition
obtains.").
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Possession

The maxim "possession is nine-tenths of the law" is familiar to
every first year law student.30 2 Indeed, many property doctrines embody this principle by favoring the ownership claims of prior possessors. A classic example is the rule of capture established in Pierson v.
1
3 There, Post was chasing a fox on an uninhabited "waste land"
Post.3o
aided by a pack of hounds.10 4 Pierson, "a saucy interloper, '0 5 espied
the fatigued fox and swooped in to kill "the wild and noxious beast"
and "bear away in triumph the object of pursuit."30 6 The court ruled
that Pierson was the true owner because only he had "occup [ied]" the
animal by taking physical possession. 3 7 As for the original hunter,
Post, the court said "mere pursuit" creates no property rights in wild
308
animals.
Another example of the primacy of prior possession is provided
by the rule of find.3 0 9 The classic rule is that the finder of a lost chattel has a paramount right in the found object against every other person, except the true owner. 31 0 The finder, by having possession of the
object, has legal recourse against other potential takers. 31 ' Thus, for
example, in Armory v. Delamirie,1 2 the court decreed a chimney
sweep's claim to a found jewel was superior to that of the jeweler to
3 13
While the
whom the chimney sweep brought his find for appraisal.
owner," it
"true
the
court recognized that the chimney sweep was not
including
of
others,
placed his rights as a prior possessor above those
31 4
himself.
for
jewel
the
seize
to
the jeweler who sought
Carol Rose, and subsequently Henry Smith and Thomas Merrill,
developed an information-based theory to explain the centrality of
possession to property law. These scholars analyzed the communicative role of possession in conveying information to third parties. Rose,
But see R. H. Helmholz, Wrongful Possession of Chattels: Hornbook Law and Case Law,
302
80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1221, 1221-22 (1986) (acknowledging that "[ilt is hornbook law that

possession of a chattel, even without claim of tide, gives the possessor a superior right to
the chattel against everyone but the true owner," and arguing that the hornbook law is not
matched by case law).
303
3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (awarding property rights in a fox to the first
possessor despite the practice that the pursuer should be entitled to catch the fox).
Id. at 175.
304
Id. at 180 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
305
Id.
.06
Id. at 179.
307
Id. at 177.
308
309 DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 280, at 103-21.
310 Id. at 105.

311 See id. (noting that "the rule that a prior possessor prevails over a subsequent possessor applies in cases involving land as well as in cases involving personal property").
312
313

93 Eng. Rep. 664 (KB.) (1722).
Id.

314

Id.
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for instance, explained that in order to function effectively, property
doctrines must take account of the intended audience and the symbolic context. 31 5 Thus, in Pierson v. Post, the court had to choose between the rule of "hot pursuit" popular among hunters and the rule
of capture that was more accessible to a broader audience, extending
beyond the community of hunters.3 1 6 This choice, according to Rose,
determines which audiences win and which lose. 3 17 Possessory rules,
in other words, are designed to convey context specific information
about the rights and duties of competing claimants over assets. 3 1
Writing alone,3 19 as well as with Merrill,3 20 Smith put a slightly different emphasis on the informational role of property. Smith and Merrill tackled the problem of how property could be efficiently protected
and transferred in a world of uncertain ownership rights. To them,
property doctrines, including the preference for possessors, are designed to convey information efficiently to third parties. 32' This is important not only in reducing the costs of discovering ownership prior
to the transfer of personal property, but also in reducing evidentiary
322
costs should disputes about ownership arise.
Beyond the informational theorists, however, scholars have had
great difficulty in explaining the primacy of possession. Richard Epstein, perhaps the foremost proponent of the rule of first possession,
is surprisingly lukewarm in his normative support for the idea of possession in the abstract.3 23 To Epstein, the primary virtue of first possession as a rule of ordering property is the fact that it is already
dominant and, therefore, lends stability to property rules. 3 24 Epstein

316

Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHi. L. REv. 73, 85 (1985).
Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 181 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (Livingston, J., dissenting).

317

Rose, supra note 315, at 85 ("Audiences that do not understand or accept the sym-

315

bols are out of luck.").
318
See id. at 88.
319 Smith, supra note 4, at 1108 (analyzing the communicative function of property law
vis-a-vis "those under a duty to respect rights" and "those wishing to acquire rights").
320
Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 4, at 8, 26 (justifying the numerus
dausus principle based on the informational costs imposed by property rights on third
parties).
321
See id. at 26; Smith, supra note 4, at 1115-25 (discussing the communicative effects
of possession).
322
See Smith, supra note 4, at 1144-46.
323
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, IntellectualProperty: Old Boundariesand New Frontiers, 76
IND. L.J. 803, 809 (2001) ("[A]n advantage to the first-possession rule that ... offsets its
evident disabilities ... [is that it] gives property a single owner."); Richard A. Epstein, Too
Pragmaticby Half,109 YALE L.J. 1639, 1655 (2000) (book review) ("The first-possession rule
has the virtue of assigning a single owner to a valuable asset... [b]ut as with all legal rules,
its strengths should not blind us to its weaknesses.").
324
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REv. 1221, 1241
(1979) ("In essence the first possession rule has been the organizing principle of most
social institutions.").
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is less sure that possession would provide a good primary rule in prop3 25
erty were it not already in use and popular.
Even more troubling, informational theorists have not devoted
much attention to two important caveats to the emphasis on possession. First, rules of possession are subsidiary, not primary. That is,
rights of owners are preferred to those of possessors, and for possession to be important, ownership must be unclear or the owner must
be unavailable to assert her rights. 32 6 As such, while the finder has
rights superior to those of subsequent takers, the true owner will still
prevail over the finder.3 27 Second, the modem trend is to deemphasize the primacy of possessors' rights. Modern find statutes, for
example, require finders to deposit found objects with the nearest police station, leaving the finder without any rights until the statutory
period elapses. 328 Both of these points demonstrate the limited range
of possessory rules.
The value theory provides a better explanation of possessory
rules, and especially of their limitations and the new trends limiting
the importance of possession. The value theory explanation also
stresses the importance of possessory rules in promoting stability,
while contributing an explanation of why stability is best achieved
through limited possessory rules. Moreover, it shows why, notwithstanding the informational aspects of possessory rules, an informational theory cannot provide a complete explanation for the
possessory aspects of property law.
The value theory views possessory rules as oriented, like all property rules, toward the protection of the value that inheres in stable
asset ownership. Possession affects value in two different ways. First,
property protection is especially valuable for possessors because it
reduces the cost of acquiring a replacement object; obviously, this
325

See Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification, and Distortion, 2003

U. CHi. LEGAL F. 475, 483 (suggesting that early societies adopted the rule of first possession by default); Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights Claims of IndigenousPopulations:The View
from the Common Law, 31 U. Toi. L. REv. 1, 15 (1999) ("I... will happily defend [the firstpossession rule] . . . [but] I give equal weight to the rule of prescription, the validity of
treaties, and the principle of finality.").
326 See, e.g., Sabariego v. Maverick, 124 U.S. 261, 298-99 (1887)
[P]ossession is always presumption of right, and ... stands good until other
and stronger evidence destroys that presumption. . . . [Until a claim of title by
possession has] matured . . . [it] may be removed from one side to the
other, toties quoties, until one party or the other has shown a possession
which cannot be overreached, or puts an end to the doctrine of presumptions
founded on mere possession by showing a regular legal title or a right of possession.
(emphasis added)). An important exception to this rule for some good faith purchasers
for value is discussed in the next subsection. See infra Part V.B.
327
See Sabariego, 124 U.S. at 299 (noting that a showing of legal title will overcome

mere possession).
328 E.g.,
N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 252 (West 2003).
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source of value applies only to possessors. A nonpossessor, by contrast, will have to incur transaction costs to obtain the primary object
as well, making replacement a relatively less costly affair at the margin.
Second, possession often enhances the subjective value that people
attach to objects. As Justice Holmes famously argued in justifying the
law of adverse possession, "[a] thing which you have enjoyed and used
as your own for a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes
root in your being and cannot be torn away without your resenting the
act and trying to defend yourself. '3 29 Whatever one may think of the
strength of the claim regarding adverse possession, Holmes's logic
certainly has resonance well beyond cases of adverse possession. The
longer one is in possession of an object, the greater the potential for
development of subjective value based on the wealth of the possessor's
experiences.
The value theory also shows why possessory rules must be subsidiary to ownership rules. Since the value of stability in ownership would
be seriously compromised by permitting current possessors to defeat
the claims of owners, the law must properly assign a lower priority to
possessors' claims. Moreover, where realistic steps can be taken to enhance the rights of the prior owner at the expense of the possessor's
rights, such as by requiring the deposit of a find at a police station, the
law of property should defend the stability of ownership rather than
the current possession. However, where prior possessors compete
with subsequent takers and the "true" owner is nowhere to be found,
the law should favor prior possessors, thereby promoting and defending the value of stable ownership.
Consequently, the value theory provides an alternative explanation for many of the possession-related property doctrines discussed
above. Consider first the rule of capture elucidated in Pierson. The
value theory seeks to protect, first and foremost, the value that results
from stable ownership. This value is fully developed only when an
asset is appropriated and stably held. While the pursuit of such an
object may give rise to a fraction of this value in the hands of the
pursuer, the value, naturally, cannot yet be complete. For the pursuer, the marginal replacement cost remains relatively low because
while obtaining replacements is costly, so is the successful completion
of the pursuit. Thus, while hot pursuit as a rule of acquisition might
easily serve the purposes of conveying information, it would not serve
as well as a rule for maximizing the value that inheres in stable
ownership.
Similarly, arguing for the importance of possession on the basis
of the value theory, rather than on information or historical accident,
329

0. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 477 (1897).
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provides the key to understanding the law of find. The value theory
posits that the value inherent in stable ownership should be protected
by allowing the owner to prevail against all, and that the prior possessor should prevail against subsequent takers in order to protect the
value of stable possession. The information theory, by contrast, has
some trouble establishing why and when current possessors should
lose to prior possessors. The importance of possession for information theorists depends on its ability to convey information,3 30 and in
the absence of alternative information sources (such as registries),
there would seem to be little reason not to give primacy to the current
possessor. Thus, the information theory would seem equipped to explain why a first finder who loses the object should prevail against a
subsequent finder .3 3 1 Indeed, if possession rules are intended to convey to potential transferees that they may rely on the possessor's title
without costly investigations, the better rule would be to favor the current, rather than the former, finder.
B.

Chain of Title

A related property concept explained by the value theory of property is the notion of chain of title. Briefly stated, property views rights
of ownership as being transferred from owner to owner in a chain. A
transferee receives only such title as the transferor conveys, and, generally the transferee cannot receive title superior to that owned by the
transferor. Thus, in order to determine to what extent any purported
owner actually holds title over an asset, one must trace the provenance
of the title to its "root," i.e., the original owner and grantor in the
332
chain.
The chain of title rule is instrumental in maintaining the value of
stable ownership by ensuring that loss of possession-voluntary or involuntary-will not, of itself, endanger the ownership right. Consequently, the status and benefits of ownership may be enjoyed without
excessive investment in the asset's protection.
The importance of chain of title is particularly noticeable with
respect to marketplace transactions between non-owning possessors
and good faith purchasers. In much of the world, a good faith purSee supra Part I.E.
First finders do typically prevail. See In re Seizure of $82,000 More or Less, 119 F.
Supp. 2d 1013, 1019 (W.D. Mo. 2000) ("[T]he first finder who acquires dominion over
[abandoned] property becomes its owner."); Lawrence v. Buck, 62 Me. 275, 275 (1874)
("[Lost] property belongs to the first finder as against all persons but the loser.").
332
For practical purposes, the "root of title" in land transaction is generally traced
back 60 years. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62-11 (West 2003) (permitting action to quiet
title if "person in peaceable possession of lands ...and claiming ownership thereof... is
unable to ascertain the name or identity of [any rival claimant] from a search of the title of
such lands, extending back 60 years from the time of the commencement of the suit").
330

331
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chaser obtains good title to personal property bought in a market setting, regardless of whether the seller actually owned the object. Thus,
for example, in many European countries, a good faith purchaser of a
painting in an art gallery will obtain good title even though it may
turn out that the gallery stole the painting from the artist. 333 This is
not the law in the United States. Here, the general rule of chain of
title dictates that a purchaser may obtain no more rights than the
seller has and wishes to convey.3 3 4 Only where a seller has "voidable"
title-meaning that she obtained the object through fraud or mistake, 335 or obtained possession through a person who has been "entrusted with the possession of the goods . . . by cosignors, creditors
with unrecorded security interests, and certain other kinds of bailors" 3 36 -does the good faith purchaser for value obtain title good
against everyone in the world, including the original owner.
For information theorists, these rules are somewhat puzzling.
Merrill and Smith, for example, suggest that the good faith purchaser
rules are designed to promote transferability by reducing the buyer's
337
costs of obtaining information about the object's provenance.
They, however, offer no explanation as to why this interest does not
compel following the European rule of transferring ownership where
the item is taken from the owner by theft rather than by fraud. Indeed, Merrill and Smith concede that, under their explanation, the
33 8
good faith purchaser rules in the United States may not be ideal.
In contrast, the value theory explains that the common law rules
regarding "voidable" title protect the stability of ownership unless the
owner herself manifests that she no longer demands ordinary protection of the value she enjoys in her ownership. For example, where an
owner parts with her object in exchange for a bad check, she has voluntarily relinquished ownership, as far as she knows, for what is presumably an agreed-upon price. Thus, while the law must protect her
33.3
See, e.g., Nat'l Employers' Mut. Gen. Ins. Ass'n Ltd. v. Jones, 1 A.C. 24 (H.L. 1990)
(appeal taken from Bridgend County Court) (dismissing appeal of decision favoring good
faith purchaser of a stolen automobile); Kuopila v. Finland, 33 EUR. CT. H.R. 25 (2001)
(reporting that the Finnish court below, while convicting the art dealer of conversion,
nonetheless ordered the painting returned to the good faith purchaser from whom it had
been confiscated; n.b., the painting turned out to be a forgery).
-334 See, e.g., Schrier v. Home Indem. Co., 273 A.2d 248, 250-51 (D.C. App. 1971) ("[A]
possessor of stolen goods, no matter how innocently acquired, can never convey good ti-

tle . . . [because] a sale of such merchandise . . . does not divest the person from whom

[the property was] stolen, of title." (citations omitted)).
-5
See, e.g., O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 867 (N.J. 1980) ("[N.J.S.A. 12A:2403(1)] ... part of the Uniform Commercial Code... does not change the basic principle
that a mere possessor cannot transfer good title . . . [but] permits a person with voidable
tide to transfer good title to a good faith purchaser for value in certain circumstances.").
336 See Schrier, 273 A.2d at 250.
337
Merrill & Smith, Property/ConlractInterface, supra note 4, at 840.
338

Id.
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interest in receiving full payment, there seems little reason to emphasize the value of a stable ownership relationship that has already been
voluntarily sundered. Indeed, this legal strategy of compromising the
property rights of the original owner, while leaving intact the right to
recover in tort for fraud, underscores the importance of an analysis
that focuses on the special value protected by property law, while leaving to other legal fields the task of utility-enhancing regarding other
values.
As for transferring title of an "entrusted" object, the value theory
concedes that the rule is based upon an assumption that the rule's
cost to the value of stable ownership is less than the potential transaction costs that would be engendered by requiring verification of title.
However, a full explanation of the entrusting rule requires an examination of property law's exclusion rules, which is discussed in the next
Section.
C.

Exclusion

The right to exclude others from using or entering into one's
property is generally seen as one of the most important rights in property;339 Merrill3 40 and others341 have gone further and argued that the
right to exclude is the defining characteristic of property. The right
to exclude spills over into many adjacent fields of law, including criminal and tort actions for trespass34 2 and trespass to chattels,3 43 the constitutional right to have one's property be free of unwarranted entry
and search, 344 and procedural rights to injunctive relief in defense of
339 See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) ("In this case,
we hold that the 'right to exclude,' so universally held to be a fundamental element of the
property right, falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation.").
340
Merrill, supranote 287, at 748 ("[T he right to exclude seems always to accompany
the right to property when and if the right becomes possessory.').
341
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy ofPruneYard
v. Robins, 64 U. CI. L. Rsv. 21, 22 (1997) ("lilt is difficult to conceive of any property as
private if the right to exclude is rejected."); Penner, supra note 85, at 742-43 (explaining
that property involves more than a right to exclude). But cf Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor,
Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. Rrv. 305, 345 (1994) ("[T]he right to
exclude has traditionally been broader . . . than justified by the . ..

benefits ...

[it]

secures.").
342
See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1067, 1069 (N.D.
Cal. 2000) (
If eBay were a brick and mortar auction house with limited seating capacity ....
[it] would . . . be entitled to reserve those seats for potential bidders . . . and to seek . . . relief against non-customer trespassers....
[The

evidence of] BE's ongoing violation of eBay's fundamental property right to
exclude others from its computer system . . . support[s a trespass cause of
action].
(emphasis added) (citing Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 (1996))).
343
Id. at 1069.
344 U.S. CONST. amend. 1V
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the right to exclude.1 45 Indeed, so powerful is the notion of the right
to exclude in property conceptions, that Calabresi and Melamed have
34
labeled the injunctive defense of entitlements as a property rule. 1
The primary justification for the preeminence of the right to exclude is that it indirectly confers upon the property holder the right to
determine the price for using the property 47 and to "hold out" for
greater compensation where others seek entry.3 48 Because compensa3 49
tion rules generally recognize only losses to property market value,
the right to exclude protects the owner's ability to preserve idiosyncratic values, such as her subjective attachment to the property. In
other words, the right to exclude defends the owner's ability to extract
the full value of ownership right before departing with it.
The value theory of property thus explains cases like Jacque v.
Steenberg Homes, Inc., in which the court approved a jury award of
$100,000 in punitive damages for an intentional trespass on real property that caused no actual compensatory damages. 350 In Jacque, the
trespasser, Steenberg Homes, decided to deliver a mobile home to
one of the Jacques' neighbors by plowing a path through the Jacques'
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984) ("Searches and seizures inside

a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable absent exigent circumstances.");
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978) ("[Wlarrants are generally required to
search a person's home or his person unless 'the exigencies of the situation' make the
needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.").
345
See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (establishing the "exclusionary
rule," which maintains that evidence obtained through an illegal search is inadmissible in
court).
346
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 111, at 1105-06; see also Henry E. Smith, Property
and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719 (2004) (arguing for tie between property rule
protection and property rights on basis of information theory).
347
Id. at 1105.
M8
Id. at 1106-07; Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View fThe Cathedral: The Dominance of
Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2092-93 (1997); Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Propery, supra note 7, at 382.
-49 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373-74 (1943)
In an effort.., to find some practical standard, the courts early adopted,
and have retained, the concept of market value. The owner has been said
to be entitled to the 'value,' the 'market value,' and the 'fair market value'
of what is taken. The term 'fair' hardly adds anything to the phrase 'market
value,' which denotes what 'it fairly may be believed that a purchaser in fair
market conditions would have given,' or, more concisely, 'market value
fairly determined.'
(footnotes omitted)).
350
563 N.W.2d 154, 166 (Wis. 1997). The jury also awarded $1 in nominal damages.
Id. at 156.
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51
Though the Jacques refused permission, Steenberg
snowy fieldY.
Homes went ahead with the trespass, knowing that the regular road
was covered by up to seven feet of snow and contained a tricky
curve. , 52 As Keith Hylton explained in defense of the punitive damage award, the substantial award was warranted by the "probable substantial secondary costs resulting from intentional invasions of
property rights," 53 notwithstanding the absence of any direct damages of the kind normally compensated in such cases. In other words,
the need to protect the value of stability in ownership warranted a
large damage award notwithstanding the lack of any permanent physical damage to the field.

Conversely, the value theory of property explains why the right to
exclude is less vigorously enforced against the "good faith improver." 35 Here, the general rule created by "betterment statutes" is
that where a trespasser improves another's property in good faith and
under color of title or a mistaken belief of ownership, the encroaching improver may recover the value of the improvements from the
true owner.3 55 Courts may also order special remedies such as permitting or requiring the true owner to sell the improved part of the property to the trespasser or even forcing a co-tenancy.
In permitting such remedies for the improver, betterment laws go
against the general trend of enforcing the owner's right to exclude,
even in the case of such apparently trivial trespasses as in Jacque. Yet,
there are two important reasons why affording better treatment to the
good faith improver does not seriously undermine the goals of property. First, because the betterment defense is predicated upon an "improvement" or "betterment" of the encroached-upon land, one can
already be sure that at least the market value of the affected property
will increase. While the encroachment may deleteriously affect the
non-market value to the owner, including the stability of ownership,
the increased market value ensures at least a partial offset. Second,
the good faith requirement ensures that the negative effect on stability value will be minimized. Only rarely will a trespasser be able to
demonstrate that her improvement was the result of a good faith mistake or good faith reliance on color of title. Consequently, the damage to stability value can be expected to be quite small.
-'1
352

Id. at 156-57.
Id. at 157.

35-3 See Keith N. Hylton, PunitiveDamages and the Economic Theory of Penalties,87 GEo. L.J.
421, 445 (1998).
'354
For a comprehensive description of state rules regarding good faith improvers, see
Kelvin H. Dickinson, Mistaken Improvers of Real Estate, 64 N.C. L. REv. 37, 42-49 (1985).
-9Id. at 42-43. Alternatively, courts may impose an equitable lien on the improved
property to avoid liquidity problems for the true owner. See id. at 45-49.
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In contrast, assessing harsh penalties for the trespass could result
in substantial loss to the good faith improver. Given the likely minor
loss of value to the property owner, the limited circumstances in
which the trespass will be excused, and the likely great loss engendered by strict enforcement of the right to exclude, the value theory
posits that injunctive relief-the standard remedy for violations of the
right to exclude-may safely be withheld in such cases.
A similar phenomenon can be seen in the case of "entrusted"
objects transferred to good faith purchasers. Favoring good faith purchasers over owners who entrusted their property to merchants dealing in goods of the same kind compromises to some extent the value
inherent in stable ownership. The diminution in ownership value,
however, is quite small and in most cases will be outweighed by the
gain to the good faith purchaser. Here, the harm produced by strict
enforcement of a chain of title approach includes a large increase in
transaction costs, because all purchasers would have to invest heavily
in examining the provenance of title. Conversely, the harm to stable
ownership is reduced by the true owner's voluntary relinquishment of
possession by entrusting the object to another's care and the limitation of the rule to good faith purchasers from a seller that ordinarily
356
sells goods of the kind.
D.

Co-Tenancies

Because co-tenancies generally involve disputes among several
owners, they require a slightly different application of the property
analysis here. 3 57 One of the rights generally enjoyed by co-owners is
the right to partition, allowing the co-owners to end their co-tenancy
and their property partnership. 358 Co-tenancies may be partitioned in
two ways: either by sale or in kind. 3 59 In a partition by sale, the coowned property is sold on the market, with the proceeds divided
among co-owners in accordance with their relative shares. 360 Partition
in kind involves dividing the co-owned asset among the co-owners in
accordance with relative shares. 361 Partition in kind often poses prac356
U.C.C. § 2-403 (2) (1988) ("Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant
who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a
buyer in ordinary course of business.").
357
The Article examines the issue of conflicts among property owners again in the
context of leaseholds, infra Part VII.C.
-958 See, e.g., Delfino v. Vealencis, 436 A.2d 27, 30 (Conn. 1980) (noting that courts of
equitable jurisdiction allow "upon the complaint of any interested person, the physical
partition of any real estate held by tenants in common").
359

Id.

360

DUKEMINIER & KRIER,

361

Id.

supra note 280, at 345-53.
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tical challenges, requiring careful examination of the value of the vari362
ous components of the co-owned assets.
Rhetorically, the courts have long exhibited a preference for partition in kind.3 63 This preference manifests itself in the rule that partition in kind will be imposed unless partition in kind is both
impracticable and seriously prejudices co-tenants' interests.3 64 In
practice, however, courts have often favored tilting the balance toward
partition by sale. 365 The courts have done so by collapsing the twopart test for partition in kind into a one-step inquiry into whether
36 6
value would be lost by opting for partition in kind.
In view of the value theory, the courts have reached precisely the
right result. Questions of practicality in the ordinary test for partition
in kind match the issue of ideal asset size noted above.3 67 As the value
theory would suggest, the courts determine the question of asset size
and forced sale by reference to value, rather than to property abstractions like Honor 's incidents. Moreover, even where partition by sale
is favored, co-tenants may bid for the sold property; thus, partition by
sale allows a co-tenant who has developed enough of a subjective attachment to have become the highest value user to take control of the
property by submitting the appropriate bid. Partition in kind, on the
other hand, may destroy value in all of those cases where preservation
of value is incompatible with changes in the underlying property's
physical nature or the property's division among many users.368
The analysis in this Article has even greater force when the asset
requiring partition is a single movable object or indivisible real property. An heirloom dish, for example, will lose its value if it is shattered

362
See Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549,
616-17 (2001).
363
Delfino, 436 A.2d at 30 ("It has long been the policy of this court, as well as other
courts, to favor a partition in kind over a partition by sale.").
364
Deljno, 436 A.2d at 30.
365 Dagan & Heller, supra note 362, at 607 ("Despite the heirs' request, and the law's
nominal preference for partition in kind, courts usually order a partition sale because the
number of heirs and limited size of the property make physical division impracticable.").
But see Note, Real Propery-Giulietti v. Giulietti-Partitionby PrivateSale Absent Specific Statutoy Authority, 26 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 125 (2004) (arguing that, under Connecticut law,
partition in kind remains the preferred remedy).
366
See Delfino, 436 A.2d at 33.
3167
Id. at 30-31 ("Under the [test for partition in kind], the court must first consider
the practicability of 'physically partitioning the property in question.'").
368
For a more extensive analysis of the tradeoff involved in partition decisions, see
Thomas J. Miceli & CF. Sirmans, Partitionof Real Estate; Or,Breaking Up Is (Not) Hard to Do,
29 J. LEG. STUD. 783 (2000) (developing a framework for choosing between partition in
kind and partition by sale and noting that the choice entails a tradeoff between economies
of scale and protection of subjective value).
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in order to distribute the pieces among its co-owners.1 69 Similarly,
when the co-owned asset is the family home, it cannot be partitioned
in kind. Thus, the defacto practice is fully consistent with this Article's
theory.
VI
REVISING PROPERTY LAW WITH THE VAILUE THEORY

This Part discusses various areas of the law that should be revised
in light of the value theory of property. As the reader should have
discerned by now, this Article's analysis favors substance over form.
Specifically, the Article seeks to do away with the "bundle of sticks"
characterization and similar lists of property incidents, and, instead,
focuses on the goal of maximizing the value inherent in stable ownership. To this end, this Part reviews several of the least coherent doctrines of property law-nuisance and takings-and shows how they
may be rendered more coherent by analysis through the value prism.
A.

Nuisance

Nuisance doctrine represents an important point of convergence
between property and torts. A cause of action for private nuisance
arises from "unreasonable interference with use and enjoyment of
land. '3 70 The first part of the definition draws heavily on the law of
torts, while the latter relies on property law. Notwithstanding the relatively straightforward definition, nuisance doctrine ranks among the
most confused areas of property law. As Dean Prosser famously stated,
371
nuisance is "an impenetrable jungle" and a "legal garbage can."
The goal here is not to recount the various intricacies of nuisance
doctrine, but rather to show how the doctrine's narrow focus on the
incidents of use and enjoyment offers incomplete protection to property owners.
At first glance, it seems that nuisance law's protection of the
owner's use and enjoyment right is fully consistent with the value theory of property. But, a closer examination reveals this is not the case.
While use and enjoyment rights do enhance the value of assets for the
owner, third parties can unreasonably lower the value of property
without interfering with use or enjoyment. Consider, for example, the
construction of a large industrial plant near a residential neighborhood. While proximity to the plant may unreasonably lower the value
of all neighborhood property, it is possible that only a small portion of
369 See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. Rev. 353, 394
(1978) (discussing a New York case in which a valuable collection of paintings was bequeathed to two museums "in equal shares").
370 DUKEmINIER & KRJER, supra note 280, at 956 (defining cause of action for nuisance).
William I. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEx. L. REv. 399, 410 (1942).
371
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homes will be directly exposed to the smoke emitted from the plant
stacks-presumably because the stacks are very tall. 372 Under these
circumstances, no remote owner would be able to bring an action in
nuisance against the plant even though the market value of her property has dropped considerably. 373 Thus, under current nuisance law,
the plant can effectively destroy the value of the remaining houses,
because their owners have not suffered unreasonable interference
with the "use and enjoyment" of their property.
In contrast, a value-oriented jurisprudence of nuisance law would
recognize the rights of all homeowners in the value of their property.
Rather than focus on the activity's effect on use and enjoyment, the
value theory would direct the court to examine the impact on value,
which would necessarily be implicated. After all, most owners are concerned about the effect of various activities by third parties on the
value of their property and not on specific incidents.
B.

Takings

The power of the government to take property through eminent
domain and the constitutional requirement that government pay
whenever it abridges property rights in a manner labeled a "taking"
are two of the most controversial and puzzling subjects in the law of
property. They also apparently send contradictory signals about the
importance of the value theory. On the one hand, the government's
eminent domain power seems to be completely at odds with the value
theory of property. After all, the government's ability to seize property directly undermines the stability of property rights. On the other
hand, the limitation of the compensation requirement to "takings of
property' seems directly to support this Article's argument that the
value of stability in ownership is a value which in itself warrants special
protection. Here, the noteworthy fact is that government actions adversely affecting a person's wealth are only compensable where they
burden property, 374 but not where they do so by nonproperty
means. 375 This Article shows that there is a place for both these aspects of takings law in the value theory. While we do not argue that
current takings jurisprudence is consistent with this Article's theory372

Not all factory activity will necessarily constitute a nuisance; rather, unreasonable-

ness is assumed for purposes of the example.
373
See generally Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Essay, Takings Reassessed, 87 V.
L. REv. 277 (2001) (exploring the effect of various land uses on the value of adjacent
property).
374
As shall be discussed presently, the question of exactly what burdens on property
are considered takings is one of the most unsolvable puzzles in the law. See supra note 281.
.75
But see Richard A. Epstein, Foreword, UnconstitutionalConditions,State Power, and the
Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60-64 (1988) (arguing that the compensation requirement of the Takings Clause should apply more broadly to wealth transfers).
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indeed, as many scholars have noted, there is little consistency in takings law no matter how you look at it 376-the takings power poses a
much smaller challenge to this Article's theory than one might initially think.
Government actors will generally avail themselves of their eminent domain power when negotiations to purchase private property
break down. In such cases, the government may take private property
without the owner's consent provided that it does so for public use
and in exchange for payment of just compensation. 377 As a "privileged taker," the government with its eminent domain power can set
aside many of the usual protections of private property and transfer
ownership to itself.378 Scholars explain that this expansive power is
necessary because the government often engages in large scale
projects requiring coordinated development such as paving roads,
building parks, and constructing infrastructure.3 7 9 In all of these instances, the government must deal with multiple property owners,
38 0
each of whom has an effective veto power over the entire project.
For this reason, negotiations between the government and property
owners may often break down, as each individual owner seeks to secure rents above and beyond her reserve price.
In Calabresi-Melamedian terms, the eminent domain power enables the government to suspend the standard property rule protection that the owner enjoys and substitute it temporarily for liability
rule protection.3 8 1 With fewer tools to defend her property rights, the
property owner enjoys less stability in her ownership, and presumably
may extract less value. Importantly, under current takings law, just
compensation for exercises of eminent domain consists of the market
value. 382 Consequently, the net effect of government exercises of eminent domain deprives property owners of that portion of the value
they have attached to their property that exceeds market price. This
will include not only sentimental value, but also the value of stability
that lies at the property system's heart.
Under the value theory, the power to seize property by eminent
domain may be justified only if exercised in limited circumstances.
Indeed, in practice, eminent domain is quite limited. The governSee supra note 281.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nior shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
378
Cf Abraham Bell, Private Takings (noting that many public takings are for private
actors, and urging greater use of a private taking power) (on file with authors).
379
See SHAVELL, supra note 143.
376

377

380

Id.

See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 301, at 59-60 ("By exercising its power of
eminent domain, the government may transform th t property rule protection into liability
rule protection.").
See supra note 349.
382
381
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ment generally prefers to negotiate a consensual transfer with private
property owners whose land may become subject to a taking. 3 3 Given
the high cost of eminent domain litigation for the government-both
in monetary and political terms-the government will often choose to
secure consensual agreement over going to court. 8 4 Thus, the eminent domain power is likely to be invoked only where there is a large
surplus to be obtained through public ownership of the property and
where there are significant and costly barriers to successful negotiations.38 5 Yet, because compensation is restricted to market value,
there is a significant risk that too much property will be taken from
38 6
owners with rational high reserve prices.
The value theory suggests that higher compensation should be
awarded in place of the ordinary market value standard. In order to
ensure that the damages paid resemble the actual value of which the
owner is deprived,38 7 owners must be able to argue for exemplary
383

Merrill, infra note 384; see also Harry N. Scheiber, The Jurisprudence-andMythol-

ogy-of Eminent Domain in American Legal History, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY AND GOVERNMENT:
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION BEFORE THE NEW DEAL 217, 226-27 (Ellen Frankel Paul

& Howard Dickman eds., 1989) (describing preference of nineteenth century railroads for
negotiated land purchase rather than seizure by eminent domain).
384 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 61, 80
(1986).
385 Id. at 80-81.
386 This Article presumes, as does much of the literature on takings, that government
actors contemplating takings are influenced by "fiscal illusion," i.e., they discount costs
imposed on the public that are not reflected in their own budgets. The aftermath of Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), provides a cogent example in support of this presumption. In 1988, South Carolina enacted the Beachfront Management
Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 48-39-250-360 (Law. Co-op. 1990), prohibiting the development of
certain coastal properties. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007. As a result, David Lucas was unable to
develop two lots that he had purchased only two years earlier for $487,500 each. Id. Following extended litigation, the Supreme Court upheld Lucas's claim that the legislation
worked a taking, and that he was therefore entitled to compensation. Id. at 2895-902.
Faced with a court order to compensate Lucas for the taking, South Carolina settled the
case by buying the lots from Lucas for $425,000 each and paying his legal costs, which
resulted in a total settlement of $1.5 million. H. Jane Lehman, Case Closed: Settlement Ends
Property Rights Lawsuit, CHI. TRIB., July 25, 1993, at G3. The state then repealed the preservation statute that had occasioned the lawsuit and put the two lots up for sale. WILLIAM A.
FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 61 (1995).

Astonishingly,

South Carolina rejected an offer from Lucas's former neighbors to purchase one of the
lots for $315,000 and preserve it undeveloped. Id. Instead, it sold the lots to a developer
for $392,500 each. Id. The numbers reveal that the South Carolina government was content to require beachfront preservation at a cost of $487,500 per lot to Lucas, but not at a
cost of $77,500 per lot to itself. Less aneedotally, the empirical data can be said to support
the presumption of "fiscal illusion." Id. at 96-97; see also Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 581 (2000); Louis Kaplow, An EconomicAnalysis of
Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REv. 509, 569 (1986). But cf Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1490 n.164 (1990).
387 For a discussion of the importance of accurate damage payments in order to reduce fiscal illusion of governmental decisions to take property, see Laura H. Burney, just
Compensation and the Condemnation of FutureInterests: Empirical Evidence of the Failure of Fair
Market Value, 1989 BYU. L. Rav. 799, 785-97; Kaplow, supra note 386, at 570; Michael H.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:531

damages a la trespass 88 in order to recover idiosyncratic value. Alternatively, damages should be raised to include a penalty reflecting the
expected gap between the actual value enjoyed by the owner and the
3 89
lower market value.
Closely related to the question of the ideal quantum of compensation is the question of what government actions should constitute
takings. While straightforward exercises of the eminent domain
power are easily identified as takings, other categories of government
action are less easily classified. The government may affect property
through the exercise of many of its powers, giving rise to a category of
"regulatory takings" which go "too far" in adversely impacting property rights while not formally exercising the eminent domain
power. 390 Additionally, the government may undertake other actions,
such as improving schools or reducing police protection, that will impact positively or negatively upon an individual's welfare without directly affecting property or invoking the obligation to pay
compensation for takings.
While the value theory cannot resolve all of the difficulties plaguing the perennially puzzling field of regulatory takings, it nevertheless
provides several important insights. First, the value theory explains
why there may be particular need to deter government actions that
reduce wealth by adversely affecting property rights (as opposed to
government actions that reduce wealth by means of other mechanisms). The Fifth Amendment protects property (and only property)
against governmental takings.3 9 1 As various scholars have noted, takings of property are only one of many ways in which the government
can affect the wealth of its citizenry. 392 Various types of regulation
Schill, Intergovernmental Takings andJust Compensation:A Question of Federalism, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 829, 859-61 (1989).
388 See Part V.C.
389 Other scholars have suggested amplified damage payments as well. See Burney,
supra note 387; Kaplow, supra note 386; and Schill, supra note 387.
390 The possibility that a regulation may work a taking was first recognized by the celebrated case of PennsylvaniaCoal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Writing for the majority, justice Holmes famously stated that "while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Id. at 415; see also DAVID
A. DANA & THOMAS WA.
MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 135 (2002) (noting that "short of 100
percent loss in value . . . the degree of diminution is just one factor to be considered [in
deciding whether a taking has occurred]").
391
U.S. CONs-r. amend. V.
392
See, e.g., Maijorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-ProgressiveIncome Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. I. REv. 465, 502 n.121 (1987) ("Richard Epstein
states that a progressive tax would be permissible if benefits from government increased
faster than income." (citation omitted)); Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law,
64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1393, 1540 (1991) ("After arguing that government regulations that
inflict loss should be viewed as presumptive rather than per se takings costonis suggests
that courts should ask the crucial question: 'whether the government['s] ... redistribution
I I . is fair in principle.'").
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and taxation impact unequally different parts of the population, and
the Fifth Amendment poses no barrier to such actions. 39 3 Yet, the
value theory posits that government actions that diminish the value of
stability in property ownership are different. This is because the government's power to take property not only threatens expropriation of
an asset's market value; it also reduces the stability of all property and
seizes the nonmarket subjective value that inheres in the asset. Consequently, there may be reason to push the government toward acquiring its revenue and assets by means that are likely to have this smaller
welfare-reducing impact.
Second, the value theory suggests that of the many different rules
that have been suggested and used throughout the years to identify
regulatory takings, the one most suited to property protection may be
the undue diminution of value standard first suggested by Justice
Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon.39 4 Indeed, if property is to be
seen as oriented toward defending value, there seems no better way to
tell whether property has been unduly hurt by government action
than to examine the effect on value. 395 Other tests either fail to address the core concern of property law or address impacts on traditional "incidents" of property. Consider, for instance, the physical
entry test, which views any physical entry on the owner's property as a
compensable taking. 396 While the entry certainly violates the right to
exclude, the effect on value may be trivial, as in Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATVCorp.,3 9 7 where the court ruled that forced access to a
cable box in an apartment building constituted a taking. This result
seems a glorification of form over substance. A different objection
may be leveled against the multifactored balancing test introduced in
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City.3 98 Penn Central creates an ad
hoc inquiry that attempts to balance three factors in determining
whether a regulatory taking has occurred: the owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations, the nature of the government action,
and the degree of diminution in property value. 399 While the focus
on value is certainly laudable, neither the nature of the government
action nor the investment-backed expectations of the owner have
much to do with the core concern of property rights-the protection
of value inherent in stable ownership. Thus, even if the Penn Central
395

394

Cf Eduardo Penalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 2182 (2004).
260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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Mahon left open the question of the baseline from which the diminution must be
measured. Id. at 419. This Article also leaves that question for other analyses. See Bell &

Parchornovsky, supra note 386, at 552.
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Id. at 438.
397 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
"598 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
399 Id. at 124.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:531

test were workable, it would make a poor candidate for a universal test
of regulatory takings according to the value theory. In establishing
that a complete destruction of a property's value necessarily constitutes a regulatory taking, Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council °00 certainly accords with the value theory. It is unclear, however, what Lucas
adds to the undue diminution test.
VII
THE BOUNDARIES OF PROPERTY

The analysis, thus far, has laid out a theory of property and illuminated the contours of property law. In this Part, we look beyond property law to other legal fields and attempt to provide answers to two
questions. First, when should property law bow to the needs of other
legal fields dealing with assets? Second, how should property react
when it comes into conflict with its own imperatives, such as when
incompatible property rights clash with one another? Some of these
questions have already been partially addressed by discussions of such
topics as eminent domain. 40 1 This Part now explicitly addresses these
questions by examining several specific examples that are typical of
situations in which the two questions arise.
A preliminary historical note is in order here. As KennethJ. Vandevelde has shown, the nineteenth century witnessed a vast expansion
in the understanding of property, as courts incorporated such concepts as choses in action. 40 2 This was due not to a revolution in theory, but rather was due to consistent efforts by claimants to take
advantage of the greater legal relief available to property claims. It is
in this light that claims of property status of such items as debts, instruments, and choses in action must be evaluated.
A.

Bankruptcy, Mortgages, and Sureties

Property is intimately tied up with the practice of granting sureties for indebtedness. Indeed, in primitive property systems that centered property rights on possession, many forms of property
developed specifically to permit systems of pledges or the extraction
of profit for the provision of credit. 40 3 For example, some have argued that leaseholds developed in England in order to provide for the
400
401

505 U.S. 1003 (1992).

402

See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development

See supra Part VI.B.

of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REv. 325, 328-30 (1980).
403
See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson & Charles Dia. Thorland, Ancient Land Law: Mesopota
mia, Egypt, Israel, 71 CHi.-YEn
used by earlier civilization).

L. REv. 321, 396-98 (1995) (explaining how pledges were
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taking of interest on loans secured by land. 40 4 Although sureties law
involves assets and may use some of the same forms familiar to property law, it is clear from the analysis in this Article that the underlying
goals of sureties law differ from those of property.
Consider a loan of $10,000 secured by a pledged automobile.
The aim here is not to enhance value by creating a stable ownership
relationship between the lender and the automobile. Rather, it is to
ensure that the lender can extract the market value of the automobile
in order to satisfy the loan. Clearly, loan transactions often sacrifice
some of the value inherent in stable ownership to increase the likelihood of repayment. For the lender, maximizing the value to be derived from the asset is less important than ensuring that the existing
asset value be used to secure the loan.
Concretely, the pledging of the automobile in the above example
is likely to destroy value in several related ways. It weakens the
owner's personal attachment to the vehicle; it transfers possession of
the car to an arguably less efficient user; and it may even diminish
what Dan-Cohen labeled ownership value 40 5 by loosening the ownership bond. For the lender, however, all of the value lost is irrelevant,
so long as the remaining value is sufficient to repay the debt. Indeed,
since the lender is unlikely to want the pledged asset herself, her real
interest will be in those asset values that can be realized in a market
transaction.
To be sure, the lender will be interested in a stable relationship
with the asset. Greater stability ensures greater likelihood of repayment. This stable relationship, however, is not one of ownership and
does not entail the same value creation of ownership as defended by
the law of property. There are instances where the law attempts both
to ensure repayment and preserve the value of stable ownership.
Such an attempt can be found in debtor-in-possession schemes in the
law of bankruptcy, for example. 40 6 These attempts, however, are the
exception that prove the rule; the difficulty in reconciling the two
goals of repayment and value through stable ownership can be seen in
the extreme measures necessary to ensure that the debtor-in-posses40 7
sion does not act to the detriment of creditor interests.
It is against this background that one can understand the controversies surrounding mortgages in property law. Formally, when a
debtor executes a mortgage, the debtor conveys title to the underlying
See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 80 (2d ed. 1993) (stating
404
that leaseholds "seem originally to have been designed to avoid the ecclesiastical prohibition against usury in connection with loans").
See Dan-Cohen, supra note 20.
405
See Thomas G. Kelch, The Phantom Fiduciary:The Debtor in Possession in Chapter11, 38
406
WAYNE L.. Rav. 1323 (1992).
Id. at 1350-1351.
407
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property asset to the creditor as security for the loan. 40 8 In turn, the
creditor agrees to reconvey the mortgage and title back to the debtor
upon the loan's repayment. 40 9 In substance, however, the parties intend only to grant the creditor a security interest in the property,
rather than full title. As a result, most jurisdictions reject the "title
theory" which interprets a mortgage transaction in accordance with its
formal meaning.41 0 Rather, most states now treat mortgages in accordance with the "lien theory," which views mortgages as merely conveying a security interest or lien on the property, while title remains in
4 11
the debtor.
How ought the law to deal with an interest denominated as property, but actually intended as a surety? The answer, unfortunately, depends on the context. Where repayment of the loan is likely, the law
has a great interest in maintaining the stable ownership value resulting from the debtor's property interest. Once levying on the asset is
more likely, however, this interest is greatly diminished. Indeed, it is
highly likely that the ownership relationship will soon be terminated
in order to allow repayment. This means that many of the values of
stable ownership will be greatly diminished. Conversely, the value of
stability in surety will correspondingly rise. Accordingly, as a debtor
edges closer to filing for bankruptcy, the law should diminish its protection of the debtor's stable ownership and increase the protection
of the creditor's ability to have the debt repaid.
Bankruptcy law, for example, empowers courts to set aside transfers of assets occurring within one year of the filing date in order to
improve the creditors' likelihood of recovering the debt. 41 2 Although
generally the law seeks to promote transferability of assets, in the case
of bankruptcy, there exists a countervailing interest in ensuring the
surety's stability by restricting assets. In bankruptcy cases, there is a
high probability that the asset owner, knowing full well that the termination of the ownership relationship is imminent, will attempt to
transfer the assets not to a higher value user, but rather to a person
who will "shelter" the asset from the creditor and return it to the
debtor at a later date. Sanctioning such practices would make it more
costly for all property owners (including those who do not default) to
borrow money against their assets and, therefore, reduce the utility of
property owners as a group.
408

See, e.g., Trauner v. Lowrey, 369 So. 2d 531, 534 (Ala. 1979) ("Execution of a mort-
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412 See discussion in Anthony T. Kronman, The Treatment of Security Interests in AfterAcquired Property Under the Proposed Bankruptcy Act, 124 U. PA. L. Rlv. 110, 110-11 (1975).
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Much of the ambiguity in secured transactions arises from the
apparently common perception that the law guarantees stability in
property law better than it guarantees stability of surety. As a result,
creditors will often insist upon clothing a security guarantee with the
form of a property transfer, in order to enjoy the benefits of property
law. This occurs, for example, in "sale and leaseback" arrangements.
A sale and leaseback involves conveyance by sale of property from the
seller to the buyer, and then reconveyance by lease of the property
back from the buyer to the seller. The result, at least formally, is that
title passes from seller to buyer while the seller retains use and possession of the asset and pays a leasing fee to the buyer. 413 The Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), however, dictates that the substance, rather
than the form of a transaction, governs whether it will be viewed as a
security interest. 4 14 Thus, even where parties purport to sell and then
lease back an asset, courts following the UCC may disregard the conveyance and view the arrangement as a loan accompanied by convey41 5
ance of a security interest in the asset while title stays in place.
The value theory of property fully endorses this focus on substance over form. Under the value theory, one does not examine a list
of "incidents" to determine where a property right resides. Rather,
one looks to the party designated to enjoy the value of the asset, in
particular the value of stability in ownership. Where it is clear that the
purported seller of the title is in fact the person who will enjoy all of
the asset's value unless there is a default on the loan, the value theory
dictates that the "seller" should continue to be viewed as the owner of
the property. Of course, the continued attempts by creditors to place
themselves under the canopy of property law may indicate that bankruptcy and surety laws systematically fail to provide sufficient protection for stable surety.
B.

Marital Property

Like issues of security interests, marital property questions arise
in endgame situations. Marital property, in this context, is a term
used to refer to assets to be divided equitably (or equally) between
divorcing spouses. 4 16 This Article's theory suggests that the term
"marital property" is a misnomer. The issue facing the court in divorce cases is not property ownership; on the contrary, it is usually
clear who owns the assets to be divided. For instance, while the state
413
See Thomas C. Homburger & Gregory R. Andre, Real EstateSale and Leaseback Transactions and the Risk of Recharacterizationin Bankruptcy Proceedings,24 RFAL. PROP. PROB. & TR.
J. 95, 95-96 (1989).
414
See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(35), 9-408 (West 2002).
415
See In re Triplex Marine Main., Inc., 258 B.R. 659, 668 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2000).
416
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75 (2004).
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laws of property may dictate that only one of the spouses is the sole
owner of a certain asset-say, a book-the doctrine of equitable (or
equal) division may still consider the book "marital property," requiring that it be divided between the spouses. 41 7 Moreover, some potential assets subject to division under "marital property" rules are not
really property at all. For example, some states consider professional
degrees to be marital property subject to division, notwithstanding
that they are not property under the ordinary property laws of the
418
state.
The theory developed here shows not only how, but also why the
definition of marital property should diverge from that of ordinary
property. Property doctrines create and defend value in stable ownership. The doctrine of equitable (or equal) distribution, by contrast,
aims to achieve a just distribution of existing value. Accordingly, the
underlying goals of property law and marital property law are widely
divergent. Moreover, these goals come into conflict in many cases
where a court, to achieve just division, must decree that certain assets
be sold at market value or allocated to a divorcing spouse who is a
lower value user.
This insight leads to two important consequences. First, distribution laws should cover those assets necessary for achieving ajust distribution of wealth, irrespective of the suitability of the assets to property
law. For example, while a university degree is not suitable to be considered property under this theory, 41 9 it may very well represent a
source of wealth that is appropriate for equitable or equal distribution. Thus, courts that have attempted to determine whether degrees
are subject to distribution by examining whether they are "property"
have approached the question from the wrong perspective. 420 Second, distribution laws should be applied so as to separate, as much as
possible, questions of distribution and ownership. In other words, a
decision that a just distribution requires allocation of the value of a
certain asset to one spouse should not automatically lead to the conclusion that that spouse should be awarded ownership of the asset.
For instance, the fact that a divorcing husband is determined to be
justly entitled to the value of a family business should not preclude a
4 21
decision that ownership should be awarded to the divorcing wife.
417
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C.

Property vs. Property Conflicts: Leaseholds

Conflicts between properties or between owners of properties are
endemic. For example, in the earlier examination of the tort of nuisance, the focus was on the narrow question of whether the tort
should address loss of value, rather than interference with use and
enjoyment. 422 More broadly, however, nuisance must be seen as raising the perennial question of how the law should treat conflicts between properties or their owners. Similarly, property vs. property
conflicts may arise in cases of encroachment and co-tenancies, as previously discussed, 4 2 1 as well as in landlord-tenant law, which is the subject of this section.
Ironically, in property vs. property conflicts, the question of protecting the value of stable ownership becomes less pressing, just as it
does in cases at the boundary of property, such as marital property.
This is due to the fact that property vs. property conflicts will almost
certainly end with one owner's stable property interest sacrificed over
that of another's. The questions are therefore similar to those raised
in the context of marital property. On the one hand, the court has to
determine ownership, respecting the need to enhance the value that
inheres in stable ownership. On the other hand, the court must also
achieve a property distribution of rights-this time on the basis of efficient allocation of rights rather than justice.
In landlord-tenant law, the boundary problem of property raised
by interproperty disputes is particularly acute. Leaseholds are generally recognized as estates in property. 42 4 Thus, when a landlord rents
an apartment to a tenant, the landlord conveys a property interest to
the tenant by means of a contract-the lease. 42 5 The landlord, of
course, retains an estate in the realty as well-the reversion. 426 Thus,
conflicts that arise between landlord and tenant may be viewed as conflicts between their respective property interests. In recent years,
courts have often resolved landlord-tenant disputes by resorting to
contract law rather than property law.42 7 This is the counterintuitive
result of a dispute in which both sides have well-defined property
rights, but diverging interests regarding the enhancement and defense of value. Both landlord and tenant know the duration and
scope of the leasehold. However, the interest of the tenant, who is
granted temporary possession of the asset, is to maximize the utility
she may derive from the asset during the duration of the leasehold,
422
423
424
425
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even if doing so will diminish the value of the landlord's reversion.
The landlord, conversely, wishes to preserve the maximum value of
the reversion property together with revenues received from the
at the
rental of the premises during the period of the leasehold, even
42 8
expense of the property's value during the leasing period.
Unfortunately, no hard and fast rule may be established for the
approach to the property vs. property dispute in the context of leaseholds. On the one hand, because disputes are between landlord and
tenant, who constitute a closed set of potential contractual parties,
there is good reason to resort to the classical economic understanding
of property as simply the set of default rules for contract. In leaseholds, the parties bargain with one another and thus have an opportunity to stipulate the terms that will govern their interaction. Because
the contractual aspects of the relationship dominate the property aspects, the application of contract remedies and rules of interpretation
is more consistent with the parties' expectations. Thus, contract law
would provide the best way to resolve leasehold disputes. On the
other hand, it is clear that there is considerable value in stable ownership for both tenant and landlord, in particular, because tenants will
often develop sentimental value for their leased premises, while landlords will frequently be better suited to extract value (due to specialized knowledge) from their premises than anyone else in the market.
These factors mitigate toward the application of property law. Moreover, leasehold disputes often must consider efficient allocation of existing property rights alongside the protection of value stemming
from stable ownership. The result is a situation in which neither contract nor property law should be seen as complete answers to landlord-tenant issues.
Yet, the value theory can help resolve some of the issues raised by
leaseholds. Consider, for example, the case of a rental apartment
abandoned by a tenant three months into a two-year rental. A contractual approach to the lease would see the abandonment as a breach
of the rental contract and require the landlord to mitigate damages by
attempting to rent the premises to another. A property approach, by
contrast, would view the leasehold as having been conveyed and would
disallow the landlord's attempt to retake possession without court order dissolving the leasehold property interest. Thus, the property approach would require no attempt to mitigate damages. Courts faced
with this question have gone both ways, although the recent trend is
to adopt the contractual approach and require mitigation of dam428
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ages. 4 29 The value theory sides with this new trend. Where a tenant
has abandoned possession of her leasehold, she has manifested just
how little value she receives from her ownership of the leasehold.
Thus, there seems little need to use the law of property to defend the
stable ownership value in the leasehold. Certainly, there is reason to
defend the stable ownership value of the landlord's reversion; however, this will not be jeopardized by a mitigation of damages rule. The
landlord will know how much value he attaches to the reversion, and
on that basis he will decide whether it is worth renting the premises to
a new lessee. The law needs only to protect the landlord's interest in
realizing the benefit of his bargain, which is achieved by applying contract law.
CONCLUSION

The project of this Article has been to demonstrate that property
law is neither an unintelligible "bundle of rights" nor a mere "background condition" that facilitates exchange. Property, in this Article's
analysis, is center stage; it is a distinct and vital legal institution of its
own merits with rules specifically designed to serve its purposes. This
Article has shown that property is best understood as a legal institution designed to create and protect the value inherent in stable ownership of assets. The framework developed in this Article should help
restore coherence and consistency to property law and scholarship.
Naturally, the breadth of the subject prevents a comprehensive survey
addressing every property doctrine or rule. Yet, the analytical approach offered by this Article should assist policymakers and legal
scholars to make progress on three central property questions: (a)
which legal relationships come within the scope of property law; (b)
what is the content of these rights; and (c) how should they be protected? Properly understood, property is a fairly coherent legal concept whose centrality in legal thought is completely justified.
The analysis here also has important normative implications.
The value prism should prove useful for courts and legislatures in designing new property regimes and revising existing ones. Not only
does it point to the core function of property law, but it also delineates the limits of the field. Moreover, by offering a full account of the
costs and benefits generated by the institution of property, the Article
illuminates the tradeoffs involved in the field of property law. Naturally, this analysis does not settle every theoretical or practical dispute
that may arise with respect to property. Nevertheless, by providing a
common basis for understanding and discussing property, the Article
paves the way for novel and insightful scholarly contributions that will
carry the study of property into the future.
429

See id.

CORNELL LAW REVJEW

[Vol. 90:531

